

# daf yomi summary

## parashat Vayigash 5781

פסחים כו - לב

EDITION: 48

### CHAMETZ AFTER PESACH

THANKS RABBI YONI ISSACSON

חמץ שעבר עליו הפסח - Pesachim 28-29 Chametz after Pesach

We are already aware that it is forbidden to eat, derive benefit from, or own Chametz during Pesach itself, and that this prohibition extends forwards to the afternoon of Pesach eve, from midday onwards.

The Mishna on Daf 28a tells us that whereas chametz that belonged to a non-Jew on Pesach (literally that Pesach "passed over") may be benefitted from by a Jew after Pesach, chametz that belonged to a Jew on Pesach may not, because the passuk says "ולא יראה לך" - chametz shall not be seen by you, which we have learnt is a source for the twin prohibition of seeing and owning chametz on Pesach (see post on Pesachim 5-7.)

We are immediately struck by the need to explain how the prohibition against seeing and owning chametz on Pesach is connected to the Mishna's חידוש (novelty) that chametz owned by a Jew on Pesach remains forbidden after Pesach, and two possibilities spring to mind:

1. Chazal learnt from the passuk that this biblical prohibition extends beyond Pesach itself.
2. Chazal forbade such chametz after pesach on a rabbinical level due to the biblical prohibition of owning it on Pesach itself, as some form of fine.

Besides for the obvious differences in how biblical and rabbinical prohibitions are treated when it comes to doubts and other difficult situations, a few POSSIBLE practical ramifications of the above analysis could be whether chametz that a Jew was unaware was in his possession on Pesach (שוגג) should be subject to the prohibition. If the biblical prohibition on Chametz in a Jew's possession on pesach simply extends to after Pesach, it would seem irrelevant whether the Jew intentionally kept the chametz in his possession or did so mistakenly.

However, if it is a rabbinical fine, it is possible, though not by any means certain, that Chazal did not extend the fine for an unintentional transgression, particularly if he performed the search and destroy operation to the best of his ability. It is also possible

though that Chazal wanted a person to be so careful that they extended this fine even to an unintentional lapse, perhaps even if he did בטול and thus never even transgressed the biblical prohibition of owning chametz at all!

In contrast, if it is simply an extension of the biblical prohibition, it does not seem likely that it would apply to someone who performed לוטב and thus never transgressed the biblical prohibition at all, but on the other hand, it would probably apply to one who transgressed the prohibition unintentionally.

The Gemara opens its discussion on this Mishna by attempting to identify whose view, amongst 3 Tannaim who debate the subject in a Beraisa, is reflected in this Mishna. It brings a Beraisa which lists 3 opinions:

1. Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is biblically forbidden for Jew to eat or benefit from chametz
2. Before Pesach (from midday on Erev Pesach)
3. During Pesach and one who does so is subject to כרת.
4. That a Jew owned on Pesach, even after Pesach

\* Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no biblical prohibition against chametz either on Erev Pesach or after Pesach

\* Rabbi Yossi haGalili holds that even on Pesach, the prohibition is limited to eating (and owning) chametz and not to benefitting from it.

The Gemara notes that our Mishna does not appear to reflect the view of any of these 3 authorities because

1. Rabbi Yehuda does not appear to differentiate between chametz of a Jew and that of a non-Jew, learning the 3 prohibited periods from the three times the prohibition of chametz is mentioned.

2. Rabbi Shimon does not appear to forbid chametz after Pesach at all 3. Rabbi Yosi holds that even during Pesach, the prohibition is only to eat chametz and not to benefit from it.

The Gemara brings two approaches two reconciling the Mishna with at least one of these opinions:

1. Rav Acha bar Yaakov says that the Mishna does indeed reflect the view of Rabbi Yehuda, but that Rabbi Yehuda compares the prohibition of benefitting from chametz to that of seeing chametz,

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which we already know does not apply to chametz of a non-Jew. According to this, we would need to say that Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is no biblical prohibition of benefitting or perhaps even eating chametz of non-Jew even during Pesach, which would be an enormous חדוש (see Rashi.)

2. Avoiding the need for such a חדוש in the words of Rabbi Yehuda (who initially appeared to be more stringent than his colleagues), Rava says that the Mishna reflects the view of Rabbi Shimon, and that the prohibition of benefitting from chametz owned by a Jew over Pesach, AFTER Pesach, is a rabbinical fine for owning it on Pesach, following the second explanation we suggested earlier of the passuk the Mishna brings- the passuk thus being the reason but not the actual source for the prohibition.

The Gemara proves that Rav Acha bar Yaakov changed his mind and accepted Rava's explanation. As such, we now have a משנה supporting Rabbi Shimon who holds that there is no biblical prohibition of chametz before or after Pesach at all and that the prohibition of benefitting from chametz owned on a Jew over Pesach AFTER Pesach is only a rabbinical fine.

It follows, based on an earlier analysis, that in case of a ספק or other situation where rabbinical prohibitions do not apply, we should perhaps be lenient, and that in situations where a person tried his best to get rid of his chametz and unintentionally left some over, there MIGHT be no need for such a fine and the chametz might be permitted.

Yet, the Rambam rules (Chametz uMatza 1/8,9) seemingly like Rabbi Yehuda, that Chametz is biblically forbidden from midday on Erev Pesach and that even if one mistakenly left chametz in his possession, or even if he did so due to matters beyond his control, it is still forbidden after Pesach (Chametz uMatza 1/4.) Whereas his former ruling is subject to debate amongst Rishonim (see for example Raavad there) the consensus of the Rishonim seems to follow his later ruling (see Ramban, Ritva, Rosh, Ran etc) and go even further by forbidding it even if he did לטוב but failed to get rid of it. The basis of these rulings is the subject of much discussion, and we shall return to it in the coming daf, Hashem willing.

In loving memory of my dear father, Moreinu haRav Avraham Ben Zion ben Azriel Hertz Isaacson zt'l (Rabbi Ben Isaacson of blessed memory), whose love of Torah, passion for justice, and acts of kindness inspire everything I do. These posts are intended to raise issues and stimulate further research and discussion on contemporary topics related to the daf. They are not intended as psak halacha. [www.yoniisaacson.com](http://www.yoniisaacson.com)

## BACK TO THE MAKOR..... ANALYSIS OF PASUKIM IN THE DAF

### THANKS

'Two Verses That Come As One' and Halachic State Change

The mishnah that opens the second chapter of Pesachim provides the timeframe during which one can derive benefit from chametz before Passover begins. As a corollary to this discussion, the gemara discusses the topic of me'ilah, which occurs when a person derives benefit from an object that has been set aside for sacred use. The prohibition on me'ilah is outlined in Leviticus 5:15-16, along with the requisite sacrifices after a violation. On Pesachim 26a, the gemara

considers three cases in which me'ilah does not apply: the sound of instruments heard in the Temple; appearances at the Temple; and the aroma from the incense burned on the altar. A dispute ensues about the last of these three as there is a baraita claiming that smelling the incense is me'ilah. How can these two positions be reconciled?

Rav Pappa adds a clarification: after the column of smoke rises from the incense, the aroma is no longer me'ilah because the mitzvah is now complete (אין בו משום מעילה, הואיל ונעשית מצותו).

But is this always true? The gemara in response brings the case of the ashes generated by the burnt offering (תרומת הדשן). Leviticus 6:3 states that '[the priest] shall take up the ashes to which the fire has reduced the burnt offering on the altar and place the ashes beside the altar'.

The gemara understands 'place the ashes beside the altar' to teach two requirements. First, the ashes may not be scattered, as they need to be placed carefully. Second, one is not permitted to derive benefit from them since they must remain beside the altar and cannot be used for another purpose. Here, then, is an example where there are limitations concerning an object that has already been used for a mitzvah. Is the case of the ashes of the burnt offering broadly applicable? Or is it more narrow?

Before making that determination, the gemara brings a second scenario in which objects used in a ritual are designated for a specific purpose afterward: the clothes of the High Priest after he has released the goats during the Yom Kippur service. In Leviticus 16:23, Aaron is commanded to 'take off the linen vestments that he put on when he entered the Shrine, and leave them there.' The gemara understands this to mean that the clothes need to be put away and never worn again after the High Priest has fulfilled this part of the ritual. Presumably, they retain residual sanctity even though they are no longer needed and therefore, one cannot derive benefit from them. In both the case of the ashes from the burnt offering and the clothes of the High Priest, there is a prohibition on deriving benefit from objects that were designated as sacred even if they have already been used for their original purpose.

However, the gemara is, in fact, bringing these two examples to make the exact opposite claim due to the principle of 'two verses that come as one' (שני כתובין הבאין כאחד). Because two verses teach the same concept--sacred objects retain their sanctity after their original use and therefore have restrictions as to how they are handled afterward--they are instead understood to be limited to these situations and should not be extended more generally. If the Torah intended to teach that one cannot derive benefit from an object after its usage for a sacred ritual as a broad principle, it would only need to state it once: either in the case of the burnt offering ashes or in the case of the High Priest's garments.

This claim might feel counter-intuitive. Surely if there are numerous situations in which the same principle holds, it should be applicable on a broad scale. Yet by invoking the principle of 'two verses that come as one', the gemara teaches instead that these cases are not indicative of a more general rule. In fact, by narrowing the scope of these restrictions, there is greater room for leniency. Sacred objects generally lose their sanctity after they are used instead of retaining it because it is no longer subject to the restrictions of me'ilah. That means that it is permitted to smell after the column of smoke has

risen, since it is no longer categorized as a sacred object.

This question of how to categorize items is one that lurks behind much of the discussion in this chapter of Pesachim. Chametz is a highly unusual category within halachah: during the time of Passover, some foods are forbidden because they acquire a different status based on their ingredients. Yet during the rest of the year, they are permitted. Why is chametz regulated so carefully? Precisely because there is no perceptible change of state that shows whether it is permitted or forbidden.

Perhaps this backdrop of chametz's unchanging appearance helps to explain why so much emphasis is placed on the precision of the Torah's words for the burnt offering ashes and the High Priest's clothing. These are items whose function within rituals is complete, as evinced by visual cues: we perceive ashes instead of a burnt offering; we see where the High Priest placed these garments after removing them. However, the Torah is coming to caution us that appearances are not indicative of a complete change of state. Instead, these items retain some residual sanctity, which requires us to treat them with care.

THURSDAY 17 DECEMBER

פסחים כו

THANKS TO HADRAN - ADINA HAGEGE

Daf 26 continues the debate about intentionality and autonomy of action (you are forced to take action), focusing on one quadrant in the intentionality-autonomy matrix: there is intent but there is no autonomy. In broad terms, the tannaitic discussion has Rabbi Shimon pitted against Rabbi Yehuda, with the former holding that intent determines culpability.

Rava and Abaye dispute Rabbi Yehuda's position: Abaye says that one isn't culpable if there's no autonomy even when there is intent, whereas Rava argues that Rabbi Yehuda is always more stringent, regardless of intent or autonomy.

The first case Abaye brings to refute Rava's position is of Rabbi Yohanan Ben Zakkai, who was permitted to benefit unavoidably (with no autonomy—he needed the shade as it was too hot to teach otherwise) but intentionally from the shade of the Heichal (sanctuary).

Rava rejects this proof, since only the sanctuary's interior was forbidden for benefit. Rava brings a story to prove his understanding: the Temple repair-people were lowered in a box so as to avoid unintentional benefit (enjoyment) from viewing the Holy of Holies. There's no autonomy—they have to repair—but it is forbidden to benefit. Abaye refutes this: there were stringencies applied only to the Holy of Holies. In a subsequent attempt to disprove Rava's position, we are reminded that the para aduma (red heifer) and "egla arufa" (the heifer whose neck is to be broken, after an anonymous dead body is found exactly midpoint between two villages) are disqualified if they perform physical labor.

The Gemara contends that the heifer is disqualified even if it threshes grain while being led to nurse from its mother. The implied intentionality (the owner benefits from the threshed grain) but lack of autonomy (the heifer must nurse) seems to support Rava. Using biblical homiletics, the Gemara rejects this. Next attempt to prove Rava's position is the obligation to safeguard a lost item. If you find a

blanket, you must spread it out every thirty days to prevent mildew (no autonomy), but if you do personally benefit (intent), you are forbidden to do so. This prohibition supports Rava. Again, the Gemara rejects this as proof: one cannot lay out the blanket because it might tempt thieves.

Finally, the Gemara brings a story of merchants carrying garments made of shatnez (forbidden wool and linen mix), for sale to non-Jews. Merchants may lay the garment on their shoulders (no intent, but autonomy). And, yet, the Gemara claims that the careful people (ויעונב) would suspend the garment further from their bodies.

This is considered a decisive refute of Rava's original interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda: it is not forbidden, so long as there is no intent (benefit), even if there is autonomy (alternate options). As in other sugiyot, the Gemara focuses on the intersectionality of intention and autonomy.

This sugiya powerfully shows the consideration necessary in every aspect of our lives: from the spiritual (Rabbi Yohanan and the heichal) to the professional (cleaning crew in the Holy of Holies) to the communal (egla arufa brought to clear the village's name of wrongdoing) to the civil (laws of lost and found) and to the individual (merchant avoiding shatnez).

The Gemara focuses on the importance of considering our options before acting. Is the forbidden act truly unavoidable, or am I somehow benefitting, and therefore my intentional choice leads me to the forbidden? Am I being true to my values in choosing this option? In closing the sugiya with the story of the careful merchants, the Gemara seems to emphasize the importance of considering one's actions with integrity, so as to make the right moral and halachic decisions.

FRIDAY 18 DECEMBER

פסחים כז

THANKS RONNEN GOLDSMITH

שילוב בין החזון למציאות. נחלקו חכמינו כיצד ניתן לקיים את החיוב "תשביתו שאור מבתיכם" - כיצד יש לבער את החמץ בפסח? אמר רבי יהודה: אין ביעור חמץ אלא שריפה. אמרו לו: כל דין שאתה דן תחילתו להחמיר וסופו להקל - אינו דין. לא מצא עצים לשורפו - יהא יושב ובטל?! מבחינת רבי יהודה חמץ הוא כל כך חמור ועל כן הדרך הטובה ביותר (והיחידה) היא לשרוף אותו. לעומתו, חכמים סוברים שניתן להשבית את החמץ בכל דרך שהיא - זריקה לים, לפורר אותו, לשרוף וכן הלאה. בטיעון של חכמים על דבריו של רבי יהודה הם לא אומרים שאין צורך בשריפה אלא הם טוענים שזו דרישה גבוהה שעלולה ליצור מצב שהביעור לא יהיה ישים. הרי ישנם אנשים שלא ימצאו דרך לשרוף את החמץ ויאלצו להשאיר ברשותם ויעברו על האיסור. חכמים רואים כאן גזירה שאין הציבור יכול לעמוד בה. ועל כן ההלכה היא כאמור לפי שיטת חכמים. בבסיס הטיעון של חכמים עומדת השקפה רחבה יותר. כפי סברתם בביעור חמץ כך גם בכל תחומי חיינו - עלינו למצוא את השילוב בין החזון למציאות. מצד אחד עלינו לשאוף הכי גבוה שאפשר בכל תחום בחיים. עם זאת עלינו גם להיות ריאליים ולבנות תוכנית עבודה ריאלית ולהיות עם רגליים על הקרקע. לימוד הדף היומי הוא על הגבול הדק הזה בין חזון למציאות. הסיבה שהוא כל כך מצליח ומושך אליו יותר אנשים מכל

לימוד קבוע אחר זה מפני שהוא נמצא בדיוק בנקודת האיזון בין החזון למציאות עבור כל כך הרבה אנשים. מצד אחד שאיפה מאוד גדולה וחשובה - לימוד דף גמרא אחד כל יום. ומצד שני בשגרה היומיומית זה אפשרי אך לא פשוט. יהי רצון שנמשיך למצוא את האיזון הראוי בין החזון למציאות

SHABBAT 19 DECEMBER

THANKS TO JOSH SAMAD

## פסחים כח

The גמרה on 28A brings different opinions about the permissibility of eating or benefiting from חמץ belonging to a Jew from mid-day on the 14th of Nissan as well as after פסח (חמץ שעבר עליו הפסח).

Rabbi Yehuda says that one who eats or derives benefit from חמץ, whether it is on ערב פסח from midday onwards, or whether it is after פסח has finished, transgresses a negative commandment. If one eats or benefits from חמץ on פסח itself, one has transgressed a negative commandment and is additionally punished by כרת.

Rabbi Shimon says that one who eats or derives benefit from חמץ both before and after פסח do not transgress a commandment, but during פסח one is liable to receive כרת and transgresses a negative commandment.

The opinion of Rabbi Shimon on the surface is extremely lenient but there are different views as to how we should understand his statement. (ד"ר רבי) say that Rabbi Shimon does not in fact permit one to eat חמץ from mid-day on פסח, however he disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda with regards to if a transgression has been committed.

As mentioned above, Rabbi Yehuda views eating חמץ from mid-day as transgressing a negative commandment. Rabbi Shimon on the other hand does not qualify this as a transgression of a negative commandment, rather it is merely contrary to the positive commandment of "תשביתו שאור מבתיכם".

According to תוספות after the 6th hour on ערב פסח eating is not a valid form of destroying חמץ, as when the פסוק says "תשביתו שאור מבתיכם" the intention is that it should be destroyed not in the usual manner one derives benefit from it (i.e. eating).

The המאור disagrees with תוספות and says that Rabbi Shimon clearly holds that חמץ is permitted even after midday and therefore eating חמץ is a good method of fulfilling "תשביתו שאור מבתיכם".

Nevertheless, the Rabbis made a גזירה not to eat חמץ from mid-day out of concern that people would be lax in destroying their חמץ, and it would remain in their possession on פסח (רבינו דוד).

during Pesach.)

Six lines further down the daf, the Gemora tells us that Rav Acha bar Yaakov changed his opinion, and does not learn the surprising view that we mentioned above.

The Gemora does this by quoting a Braita that discusses whether someone who eats chametz of hekdesch has transgressed 'Meila', i.e. deriving personal benefit from the use of hekdesch. The Braita offers five different interpretations, one of which is by Rav Acha bar Yaakov, where he clearly explains Rabbi Yehuda as saying that not only is chametz of a non-Jew forbidden during Pesach, but it is also prohibited even after Pesach.

The first of these five approaches is based on one of my favourite concepts; 'Kam leh bederabah mineh', which means when a criminal act triggers two punishments, only the more serious punishment is carried out. For example, if someone sets fire to his neighbour's haystack on Shabbat, he is subject to the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat, and should pay damages for destroying the haystack.

The concept of 'Kam leh bederabah mineh' tells us that as he is walking to be executed, the bailiffs don't tap him on his shoulder and say, we need \$50 to pay for the haystack - the more serious punishment is deemed to be sufficient.

What's interesting is what happens when the person is not actually put to death by the Beit Din - does this principle still apply? In Bava Kamma 4a, 26a, according to the Tanna Debei Chizkiya, even if one has killed accidentally and is therefore not liable for execution but has to run to the 'cities of refuge', he still does not have to pay for any damages incurred whilst committing the murder. On our daf, the Gemora brings another possibility, quoting Rabbi Nechunya ben Hakana.

He says that just like on Shabbat when burning a haystack results in execution but no payment, the same applies if one sets a fire on Yom Kippur. Unlike Shabbat, one is not put to death by the Beit Din for transgressing Yom Kippur, instead one is punished by Karet, a death penalty in the hands of Hashem, but that also frees you from any monetary punishment.

The Gemora uses this argument to explain why one should not be guilty of Meilah when one eats chametz of hekdesch on Pesach, as eating chametz also makes one punishable by Karet, and therefore one is exempt from the financial punishment of Meila.

MONDAY 21 DECEMBER

THANKS DANIEL STRAUCHLER

## פסחים ל

Pesachim Daf 30 (Based mainly on Rabbi Rosner's Lomdus on the daf shiur) The daf starts with Rava's psak regarding the three way macholoket regarding chametz mixtures on Pesach:

"בין במינו בין שלא במינו אסור במשהו כרב." Rashi understands that Rava paskens that all issurim במינו are אסור במשהו, and regarding chametz there is an additional gzeira that שלא במינו is also אסור במשהו.

Uncharacteristically, Rashi paskens and says that all issurim במינו are אסור במשהו (like Rabbi Yehuda who says blood is not 'batel' blood, as we learn from mixing blood on Yom Kippur) and says the

SUNDAY 20 DECEMBER

THANKS BENNY LAST

## פסחים כט

The Mishna on 28a tells us that the chametz of a non-Jew that is in the possession of a Jew over Pesach is permitted for benefit after Pesach. Our daf begins by trying to determine whose view is presented in the Mishna. Is it Rabbi Yehuda, who says that not only may one can benefit from, and indeed eat, the chametz of a non-Jew after Pesach, one may even benefit from and eat that chametz during Pesach! (This is how Rashi explains the Gemora. Tosefot says a Jew cannot eat this chametz on Pesach, but can derive benefit even

concept of 'ta'am/bitul b'shishim' only applies to ונימב אלש, but we don't hold like Rashi. Rabbeinu Tam disagrees with Rashi and says in general we don't pasken like Rebbi Yehuda, but with chametz there is a special chumra to pasken like Rebbi Yehuda. Rabbeinu Tam further suggests, based on a different girsra, that really chametz is also batel b'shishim like other issurim (but he did not pasken this way halacha l'ma'aseh).

Why is chametz different from other issurim that are generally batel b'shishim? Rosh says the chumra is kares, while Tosofot in Chulin says it's the additional issur of bal ya'ra'eh and people don't separate from it. The nafka mina would be after chatzos on Erev Pesach when there is no kares but there is bal ya'ra'eh, according to some Rishonim. The Rambam and Ramban say chametz is more machmir since it's a 'davar sheyesh lo matirim' - after Pesach it will be mutar and therefore it's not batel following the general rule that 'davar sheyesh lo matirim' are not batel even in a thousand.

Even though there is an 'issur chametz sha'avar alav haPesach', this carries a DeRabanan penalty, and the penalty cannot make rules of bitul more meikel - a chumra can't become a kula. The Mordechai argues that chametz is not a 'davar sheyesh lo matirim' since it will become assur next year.

The Tzlach explains that whether chametz is considered 'davar sheyesh lo matirim' depends on how we understand the reason for it not being batel. Rashi explains that can just wait so that would apply to chametz. Ran explains that a clash of issur vs. heter is needed for bittul, but 'davar sheyesh lo matirim' is not assur enough to clash.

Therefore, since chametz always retains issur in subsequent years, it still has enough issur to clash and be batel. Rabbeinu Dovid offers another reason why 'davar sheyesh lo matirim' doesn't apply to chametz; since chametz must be destroyed, we do not apply concept based on being able to wait until it is mutar.

TUESDAY 22 DECEMBER

THANKS TO DAVID GROSS

פסחים לא

The daf is taken up with the following dispute: If one lends on collateral, to whom does the collateral belong? According to Abaye, given the fact that there is an outstanding loan, this generates sufficient quid pro quo that the collateral can be considered as having changed ownership.

Rava, however, holds that while there is an outstanding obligation, given that the repayment date remains in the future at an agreed upon date. This has a number of ramifications, including a case of inheriting a debt from one's father, and the manner in which an obligation to a third party can be repaid, and whether such a liability can be paid with land or movable objects.

The Gemara then discusses the halacha in the case of a non-Jew who loaned money to a Jew on collateral, the collateral being chametz which was subsequently to be redeemed after Pesach: the chametz would be permitted for deriving benefit, though forbidden to eat.

According to the outline above, Abaye holds that since the existence of the loan creates the obligation that accords. However, according to Rava, that is only the case if the chametz is located

within the domain of the non-Jew, as that is the parameter which is sufficient for the "transfer" of ownership.

WEDNESDAY 23 DECEMBER

THANKS TO DR YARDAENA OSBAND - TALKING TALMUD PODCAST

פסחים לב

כתנאי: האוכל תרומת חמץ בפסח — פטור מן התשלומין ומדמי עצים,  
דברי רבי עקיבא. רבי יוחנן בן נורי מחייב. אמר לו רבי עקיבא  
לרבי יוחנן בן נורי: וכי מה הנאה יש לו בה? אמר לו רבי יוחנן  
בן נורי לרבי עקיבא: ומה הנאה יש לאוכל תרומה טמאה בשאר כל  
ימות השנה, שמשלם! יאמר לו: לא! אם אמרת בתרומה טמאה בשאר  
ימות השנה, שאף על פי שאין לו בה היתר אכילה, יש לו בה היתר  
הסקה, תאמר בזה — שאין לו בה לא היתר אכילה ולא היתר הסקה! הא  
למה זה דומה — לתרומת תותים וענבים שנטמאה, שאין לו בה לא  
היתר אכילה ולא היתר הסקה. יאבמה דברים אמורים — במפריש תרומה  
והחמיצה, אבל מפריש תרומת חמץ — דברי הכל אינה קדושה.

The Gemara comments: The question of whether one must repay according to the measurement or the monetary value of the teruma is like a dispute between tanna'im, as it was taught in the Tosefta: If one eats teruma of leavened bread on Passover, whether intentionally or unwittingly, then he is exempt from payment and for its monetary value in wood; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

Whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri deems him liable to pay. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: What benefit can he derive from this? What benefit could the priest have derived from this teruma as it is prohibited to benefit from this teruma and the teruma is therefore worthless?

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to Rabbi Akiva: What benefit can one derive from eating ritually impure teruma on the rest of the days of the year, and yet nevertheless the non-priest is still obligated to pay for what he has taken.

Despite the fact that a priest may not eat impure teruma, a non-priest must reimburse the priest for the principal of the teruma and add an additional fifth if he eats it. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, a distinction can be made between these two cases: If you say that he is obligated to pay in a case of ritually impure teruma on the rest of the days of the year, that although it is not permissible to eat it, the priest is nevertheless permitted to burn it and derive benefit from the heat generated as a result of this burning, shall you also say the same with regard to this, teruma of leavened bread during Passover, that is not permitted to be eaten or burned? Rather, to what may this be compared?

It is similar to teruma of berries and grapes that became ritually impure, which is not permitted to be eaten or burned, as berries and grapes are unfit for firewood. The Tosefta adds: In what case is this statement said, that these tanna'im disagree about the reimbursement for teruma? It was said with regard to a case where he separated teruma in a permitted manner and it became leavened during Passover.

However, if he separated the teruma from leavened bread during Passover, then everyone agrees that it is not consecrated, as it is worthless. The Gemara is in the middle of discussing what happens if a non-Kohen eats chametz treumah on Pesach.

The Gemara explains that the halacha around this issue is actually a Machloket Taanim and quotes a Baraita with a discussion between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri. This baraita is interesting because although it seems it is discussing a straightforward case the debate between the two ta'anim shows that there are many issues to consider when trying to decide the psak halakha.

First, can chametz terumah be considered valuable to the Kohen on Pesach and therefore deserving of Tashlumim for being eaten when the Koehn cannot derive any benefit from Chametz on Pesach.

Second, Tamei (ritually impure) Terumah is still of value to the Kohen because it can be used as fuel even though it cannot be eaten and therefore even eaten Tamei Terumah by a non-Koehn must be paid back.

Third, certain foods like mulberries and grapes lose their value to the Kohen if they become Tamie because they cannot be used as fuel (since their water content is so high they cannot be burned).

Fourth, chaemtz cannot be designated as Terumah on Pesach - chametz cannot be designated as something of value to the Kohen during a time when any benefit of chametz is prohibited. The detail of the discussion in this Baraita between Ta'anim is a wonderful example of halakhic thought process and how multiple issues are often considered when trying to determine a final psak.