daf yomi summary parashat Lech Lecha 5781

עירובין עד - פ

EDITION: 39

SLEEP EASY AND CARRY WELL!

THANKS TO RABBI DOVID HORWITZ

The pages of gemara that we have been learning over the last couple of weeks discuss the laws of how to make an Eiruv Chatzeirot to enable residents to carry objects from their homes into their courtyards. This mechanism of Eiruv can also be used to merge numerous courtyards with their adjacent streets. The gemara calls this Shituf Mavuot. The concept is the same. All residents donate a portion of bread and the food is placed together in one of the houses to make an eiruv chatzeirot, or the food is placed in a chatzeir to make a shituf. By making a shituf, we are essentially merging the entire neighborhood into one domain. By doing so, each person can carry throughout that neighborhood, provided that the area was properly enclosed with halachically valid partitions, thereby turning the area into a private domain. Since the whole idea of eiruv or shituf is that we are all united into one domain, the gemara requires that the food of the eiruv be accessible to each and every resident of the neighborhood. The gemara states that a Kohen cannot take part in the eiruv if the bread of the eiruv was placed in a cemetery, since the Kohen has no access to it.

Considering this, I thought of an interesting question. During the first coronavirus lockdown, the government prohibited traveling beyond 100 meters from our homes. During the second lockdown a few weeks ago, they prohibited traveling beyond 1000 meters from our homes. The eiruv that allows Raanana residents to carry on Shabbat is made by the Rav of Raanana. He takes the proper measure of bread, matza actually since it lasts for a long time and does not need to be replaced weekly, and places it in his chatzeir. Those that live farther than 100 meters from the eiruv bread should be prohibited from using the eiruv since according to civil law, they are unable to walk to the Rabbi's house to partake of the bread. I wonder if anyone even thought of this potential problem. I certainly didn't until today! Perhaps you will say that civil restrictions don't invalidate the halachic validity of eiruv? Actually a similar question was brought to the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem many years ago, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, when the British imposed a lockdown every evening for the entire night and the Jews were unable to leave their homes and he writes that the civil restrictions of the lockdown would indeed invalidate the Eiruv based on the idea that if you cannot

travel to the eiruv on Shabbat, then the eiruv is invalid for you. There are opinions who argue with this ruling and say that since the eiruv was made according to halacha and it is merely an external issue that is preventing the person from traveling to the eiruv, the eiruv is still valid. Only when the eiruv was not made properly, for example it was made in a cemetery knowing the halachic limitations it imposes on a Kohen, then it would not work for the Kohen. When the Eiruv is made properly and external extenuating circumstances prohibit a person from traveling to the Eiruv, then according to most opinions, it would remain valid.

So sleep easy and carry well!

THANKS TO HADRAN

עירובין עד

The famous line "all I really need to know, I learned in Kindergarten" can be applied with steroids to the Talmud: "The professional values I need to know can be extrapolated from Daf Yomi"

At the outset, Daf 74 seems to be a painstaking analysis of Eruv, what and where. But the Daf actually also emphasizes (again) the importance of mutual accountability and growth mindset. The Daf discusses the leniency which allows establishing an eruv into an alley; this leniency would allow carrying into the alley from the courtyard - although definitely not from the house. Rav's position puts guardrails around that leniency, requiring the presence of at least two houses opening to the alley.

Rav seems to imply the principle of mutual accountability: by virtue of being present, each household can remind the other that, although the eruv allows them to carry to the alley, they may not carry from their homes. In this way, each household is mutually accountable for the other's upholding of halacha. Shmuel does not agree with Rav's premise, and instead allows the leniency of an eruv in the alley even if there's just one house. In other words, Shmuel surprisingly seems to counter the basic principle of mutual accountability.

Later in the Daf, Rabbi Elazar incredulously questions Shmuel's position, suggesting that Shmuel prescribes to the idea of mutual accountability elsewhere. When confronted, Shmuel answers with silence, seemingly accepting that his position was wrong - and acquiescing that mutual accountability trumps.

Shmuel's silence and willingness to change position is illustrative of the importance that the Amoraim placed on a "growth mindset," a willingness to counter long-held positions and learn from others, a commitment to every-day improvement and intellectual growth. And although the Talmud resonates with debate and disagreement, the willingness of the rabbis to admit that they were mistaken - to turn an initial understanding upside down - is at the core of how they learned.

And so, in keeping with this tradition of growth mindset, Shmuel integrates the idea of mutual accountability into his worldview and develops a richer halachic standpoint as a result.

FRIDAY 23 OCTOBER

עירובין עה

THANKS

The Mishna on daf 75 deals with a case of two residences, one within the other. Both these residences have courtyards. If the inner house made an eruv, it is permitted for the residents of the inner house to carry into the inner courtyard, but it is forbidden to carry into the outer courtyard. If only residents of the outer house made an eruv, those in both the inner and outer are forbidden to carry.

If each of the residences made an eruv by themselves, Rabbi Akiva holds that it is forbidden to carry in the outer courtyard due to drisas haregel of the inner courtyard. The Chachamim hold that in this case, members of each residence can carry into their own courtyard, because in their view drisas haregel does not forbid it.

The Mishna continues and says that if residents of the outer house forgot to make an eruv, it is permitted to carry in the inner courtyard but not the outer one. If residents of the inner house forgot to make an eruv then both courtyards are forbidden. The Mishna concludes that if there is only one person in each residence they do not need to be meiruv.

Shabbat 24 October

THANKS TO GASTON GRAUSZ

עירובין עו

עירוב שתי חצרות - מניין מוצקין המשנה הפותחת את הפרק השביעי במסכת עירובין דנה בשתי חצרות הסמוכות זו לזו וביניהן חלון - באילו מקרים שתי החצרות יכולות לערב כאחת, ובאילו מקרים כל חצר מערבת בפני עצמה. המשנה קובעת שכאשר החלון שבין החצרות רחב ארבעה טפחים ונמצא למטה מעשרה טפחים - החצרות יכולות לערב יחדיו, אך אם החלון קטן יותר או גבוה יותר משיעור זה - על כל חצר לערב בפני עצמה. מפשט רש"י וכך דעת הרמב"ם נראה שחלון הנמצא למעלה מעשרה טפחים אינו פוגם במחיצה שתחתיו, וממילא יש כאן מחיצה מלאה המפרידה בין שתי החצרות, ואילו חלון הנמצא למטה מעשרה טפחים גורם לכך שהמחיצה לא תיחשב מחיצה שלימה, שהרי אין בה עשרה טפחים. לעומת זאת, מדברי המאירי עולה הסבר אחר: "אם כלה למעלה מעשרה אין התשמיש נוח בה מזו לזו". לדעתו הסיבה לכך שחלון הנמצא למעלה מעשרה טפחים אינו מחבר בין שתי החצרות היא שחלון כזה אינו יכול להיחשב פתח, משום שקשה להשתמש בו, יתכן שהמחלוקת בין הראשונים תלויה בהבנת יסוד דין צירוף שתי חצרות לעירוב אחד: א. הרמב"ם סבור שכדי לערב יחד שתי החצרות צריכות להיחשב כרשות אחת, ואם יש ביניהן מחיצה - היא הופכת אותן לשתי רשויות. ב. המאירי סבור שעירוב

שתי החצרות יחדיו תלוי בכך שמדובר במקום דירה אחד, וכל הדיירים יכולים להיחשב כשותפים המשתמשים בחצר ביחד, לפי הרמב"ם, המתמקד בהגדרת החצרות כרשות אחת, תפקידו של החלון הוא לפגום במחיצה ולמנוע ממנה להפריד את שתי החצרות. אך לפי המאירי, התולה את הדברים ביכולתם של דיירי החצרות להשתמש בחצרות במשותף, החלון ממלא תפקיד חיובי - הוא מחבר את שתי החצרות ומהווה שטח משותף שבו כל הדיירים משתמשים, לכן סובר המאירי שהעיקר הוא שהחלון יהיה במקום שבו אפשר להשתמש בו בקלות. נפקא מינה אפשרית בין שתי הדעות נוגעת למקרה שבו החלון אינו עומד בגדרים שנקבעו במשנה, ולמרות זאת הוא פוגם את המחיצה שתחתיו, מקרה כזה מובא בחזון איש, כאשר החלק הבנוי שמעל החלון קטן מהחלון עצמו - מצד דיני מחיצות החלון אמור להצטרף לאויר שמעל המחיצה ולבטל את החלק שביניהם, וכך למנוע מהכותל להיחשב כמחיצה, אך לדעת החזון איש לא די בכך, ויש צורך שהחלון עצמו יהיה ארבעה טפחים על ארבעה טפחים, כדי שיהיה ראוי לתשמיש, נראה שדבריו מתאימים לשיטת המאירי, ואילו לדעת הרמב"ם חלון כזה יאפשר לשתי החצרות לערב יחד, שהרי סוף סוף אין כאן מחיצה. במניין מוצקין החצרות פתוחים בכלל, אז נחכה לפרק "השותפין" בשביל ללמוד על היזק ראיה.

SUNDAY 25 OCTOBER

עירובין עז

THANKS TO BENNY LAS

The Gemora on Daf 77a begins by explaining the Mishna at the bottom of Daf 66b. The first two cases of the Mishna seem straightforward, without any arguments: If there is a wall between two courtyards, and the wall is at least 10 tefachim high and 4 tefachim wide, then each courtyard can make its own eruv, but you cannot make one large eruv covering both courtyards as the wall (with no openings) is separating them.

However, if there is fruit on top of this wall then you can climb up and eat the fruit while sitting on the wall, but you cannot carry fruit up or down. Rashi explains the reason for this is that the top of the wall is considered part of the two courtyards, both of which have access to this wall. Therefore, if you were to bring fruit down (or up), it could be considered like carrying from one courtyard (your neighbour's) to another courtyard (your own), and this is prohibited rabbinically. Rashi then comments on why the Mishna tells us that the wall is four tefachim wide, saying it is relevant for the second case the fruit on the wall. In the first case, when a wall separates two courtyards, it does indeed need a minimum height of 10 tefachim for an eruy, but the width is irrelevant. In the case of the fruit on the wall, as the Gemorah will go on to discuss, the rules change if the wall is less than 4 tefachim wide, and that is why the Mishna specified here that the width is four tefachim. However, not all commentators agree with Rashi.

Later on this daf we will discuss the case of a ditch, similar to a wall as a type of separation, but going down instead of up. In a Mishna on the next daf, it states clearly, in parallel to the first case of our Mishna, that if a ditch separates between two courtyards, and the ditch in 10 tefachim deep and 4 tefachim wide then each courtyard can make their own eruv, but they cannot make one large eruv. In other words for a ditch to be considered a separation is must be four tefachim wide.

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Asks the Rashba, so why does Rashi say that a wall does not have to be four tefachim wide? Maybe the rules for a wall are exactly the same as for a ditch, and when our Mishna began by referring to a wall 10 tefachim high AND 4 tefachim wide, maybe these measurements indeed apply to both cases, which fits in better with a simple reading of the Mishna.

The Rashba suggests a possible answer, highlighting a difference between a wall and a ditch. The ditch acts as a separation, an obstacle between the two courtyards as you have to step over it, and a width of four tefachim or more can be significant, while a ditch of one tefach is hardly any obstacle.

A wall however, acts as a separation by virtue of its height, but its width is less important. While most commentators follow Rashi's approach, the Rashba does point out that there are several that disagree, and maintain that for a wall to be a separation as described in our Mishna, it must indeed be at least four tefachim wide.

MONDAY 26 OCTOBER

עירובין עח

Our gemara, when discussing the applicability of a tree serving as an ad-hoc ladder between two separate courtyards - does that count as a valid passageway or not? The issue is that even if it may be considered a "doorway", it is forbidden on a rabbinic level to climb trees. Therefore, on shabbat, one is forbidden from actually using this doorway on shabbat, when it would be most needed for the eruv! A new concept, which is used in only other place in Shas explicitly, of "אריא הוא דרביע עליה", literally "there is a lion lying across it", that it is unusable due to something external. This argument implies that the אפצא, the object itself, is worthy to be used for this purpose, and external factors cannot remove that status.

Another example of this is in Masechet Shavuot: dust is not considered food. However, though the consumption of בבילה, meat from a carcass that was not slaughtered correctly, may be forbidden due to a Torah prohibition, this does not render it a non-food item. When someone makes a vow to refrain from consumption of food, any consumption active genia active genia active genia active. This rule applies to applies to even though its consumption is prohibited without the vow, since it is still considered food. However, since dust is not considered food, any consumption whatsoever, even enough, would be prohibited.

TUESDAY 20 OCTOBER THANKS TO DAVID CDOSS

עירובין עב

The Mishna on 79b raises an interesting question: Does one need to perform an act of acquisition on the eruv or not? And if not, what affects the גמירות הדעת that renders the eruv functional?

The answer is not uniform for different types of eruvin; ערובי תחומים and ערובי תחומים are considered qualitatively different. In the first instance, Shmuel holds that שיתופי מבואות does require an act of acquisition while Rav disagrees, yet their positions reverse when discussing עירובי תחומין.

Tosfot explains Rav's position; the individual connected to the eruv also has a direct interest in the outcome and that is sufficient to apply to everybody else. Tosfot also explains Shmuel's position on

עירובי תחומין not requiring an act of acquisition, saying that in that case at least one other person will have asked the person making the eruv to do so and that request creates sufficient גמירות דעת.

We can ask a further question regarding acts of acquisition - why is it in this case that lifting the object one tefach is sufficient, when in general, other acts of acquisition require three tefachim? Tosfot answers that since eruvin are only rabbinic in nature, one tefach is sufficient. The Meiri says that Rabeinu Tam holds that one tefach is actually only what is required to effect an acquisition and uses our Gemara as a proof.

The Gemara explores a disagreement between Rav and Shmuel on

JEDNESDAY 28 OCTOBER

עירובין פ

THANKS TO DR YARDAENA OSBAND - TALKING TALMUD PODCAST

whether zikuy is needed for an eruv. Zikuy is when the person establishing the eruv gives possession of the eruv to the people on whose behalf he is establishing it. Rav teaches that zikuy is not needed for a Shituf Mavoi but is needed for an Eruv Techumim. Shmuel teaches that zikuy is needed for a Shituf Mavoi but not for an Eruv Techumim.

The Gemara explains that Shmuel's opinion is easily understood because it is consistent with the Mishna, but Rav's opinion is difficult to understand. In order to explain Rav's opinion a story about Rav Oshyahu's daughter in law is shared. His daughter in law went to the bathhouse outside the techum on erev Shabbat. When her mother in law saw that she would not make it back before Shabbat she went and made an Eruv Techumim on her daughter in law's behalf.

When Rabbi Hiya heard this he declared that this is not a valid eruv. The Gemara is puzzled by this: Why should this not be a valid Eruv? In fact, Rabbi Yishmael, on hearing Rav Hiya's decision, reminds him that regarding eruv the halachic decision is usually decided leniently (mekil) and not stringently (machmir). The chachamim are surprised by Rabbi Hiya's statement, and multiple chachamim are asked to explain Rabbi Hiya's reasoning.

They give two possibilities:

- 1. That the mother in law never gave possession of the eruv to her daughter in law, rendering the eruv invalid.
- 2. Since the eruv was made without the daughter in law's knowledge it is not a valid eruv.

Finally, after asking many rabbis, Rabbi Yaakov is instructed that when he travels to Eretz Yisroel, he should take a detour to the Ladder of Tyre and ask Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi. Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi answers that the reason Rav Hiya said this is not a valid eruv is because the mother in law never gave possession of the eruv to her daughter in law. One of the peculiarities of Hilchot Eruvin is that since the entire set of laws are rabbinic, the halachot cannot be learned from pesukim, but rather over and over again in Masechet Eruvin the halachot are learned from precedent - actual cases of eruv as it was practiced in the times of the Amoraim.

This daf shows an example of this type of learning, trying to understand the parameters of the halachot of Eruv based on an actual case.