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The Universalism of Particularity

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JUDAH-ISM AND UNIVERSALISM

In the 1960s, Rabbi David Luchins, then a student of Rav Ahron Soloveichik, mentioned to Rav Mordechai Gifter that Rav Ahron, known for his interest in current events and public affairs, was at that point very concerned about the suffering in the African region of Biafra. Rav Gifter remarked in admiration, “It is not just that Rav Ahron is the only Rosh Yeshiva that speaks about Biafra, it’s that he is the only Rosh Yeshiva who ever heard of Biafra.”¹

The universalistic streak in Rav Ahron Soloveichik’s *yahadut* is a well-known aspect of his legacy, and it has always been a dear one to me. Yet equally dear is an insight of his that I repeat often: the fact that members of *kelal Yisrael* are now called *Yehudim*, which is rife with hashkafic significance.² If, he suggested, we have come to be known not as Abrahamites but rather as *Yehudim*, if we are named for Judah

whether or not we directly descend from him, it is because of Judah's great moment of repentance, his proud proclamation to his father regarding Benjamin: *anokhi e'ervenu!* Judah-ism, by its very name, proclaims that a Jew is bound to every other member of the Jewish people in a way that is more profound than the ethical obligations binding us to the rest of humanity. We are members of mankind—but we are also first and foremost members of a nation that is a family, in which every other Jew is our brother and sister.

These two aspects of my grandfather's worldview—particular and universal, or, in the Rav's formulation, *ger* and *toshav*—are often described as coexisting in a dialectical, or contradictory, manner. It is true, of course, that there is a *practical* tension between one's obligations to one's people and to humanity, just as there is a practical tension between *talmud Torah*, *tefillah*, *hesed*, and many other *mitzvot*; after all, every one of us has a limited amount of time and resources. Nevertheless, I believe that there is no *philosophical* or *theological* tension between these two themes. Indeed, if the Abrahamic identity comprises both *ger* and *toshav*, it is because these two facets are, from the perspective of Jewish ethics, not contradictory, but *ha be-ha talya*, and that the hierarchy of obligations inherent in Judaism is part-and-parcel of Judaism's message to the world. In this essay, I will outline why I believe this to be so, and why the communication of this message to the next generation is so vital to the future of Modern Orthodoxy.

YEHUDAH, YAHADUT, AND MODERNITY

If, as my grandfather insisted, the term *Yehudi* embodies the familial obligations of Judaism, then we must appreciate the full significance of the name, and of Judah's story to our own appellation. Following his participation in the kidnapping and sale of Joseph, Judah, we are informed, left his brothers, “went down from them” and wedded a woman; that is, separated himself from his family and founded a new one. Coming immediately, and jarringly, after the tale of Joseph's kidnapping, this sentence's placement is significant. Why Judah wished to leave his brothers is unclear, though we can guess. Perhaps, burdened by the guilt of what he himself had done, he was desperate to escape

the daily familial and fatherly reminder of his crime; or perhaps, aghast at the even more murderous intent of his brethren, he wished to no longer live among them. Whatever his motivations, the text makes his intentions obvious: Judah wished to no longer be associated with his family; he sought to start a new life and a new identity.

In Judah's attempt to abandon his family we find a most modern idea: the notion that anyone can be anything one wishes to be, that no identity is predetermined, and that one's background can be shed like a suit and replaced with another. Judaism, however, insists that taken to an extreme, this denies something fundamental about human nature. *Ki ha-Adam ez ha-sadeh*, we are informed in Deut. 20:19, and the explanation of this seemingly strange comparison, for the Rav, is that man, much like a tree, *has roots*, a past, and is defined by them and connected to them. When one is born a Jew, one is immediately considered a member of the Jewish nation, and nothing can undo this Jewishness. Thus one who sees his father, or brother, the way he would see a stranger—one who assumes that he has no greater connection to his mother than to someone he just met—is adopting a perspective that is unnatural and wrong. Nevertheless, it is just this perspective that is an essential aspect of modernity. Here it bears quoting Michael Wyschogrod:

The Enlightenment's understanding of human identity, while not focused on faith in Jesus, shares with the Christian view the focus on human autonomy. Each rational human being chooses her own identity. Aspects of one's identity not of one's own choosing, such as sex, nationality, and age, are deemphasized. Instead, a person is depicted as largely responsible for her identity as a result of choices made. The major difference between the Christian and Enlightenment views is that in the Christian view, God's grace plays a controlling role in the decisions human beings make. But if we can bracket the doctrine of grace, both the Christian and Enlightenment views depict a human being defined by the choices made and the life led. It is not the condition a person is born into

that matters, but what the person makes of the condition in which she finds herself.³

In this *perek*, we witness Judah's attempt to deny the pull of his past, the obligations of origin. In describing Judah's refusal to allow his son Shelah to fulfill the obligation of *yibbum*, the text is making clear to us that Judah had not learned the lesson of his misdeeds in the Joseph story, and that he further sought to sever all family connections from his past. As Leon Kass notes:

Symbolically, in withholding Shelah, Judah . . . defies the commandment to be fruitful and multiply, he denies Tamar her marital and maternal fulfillment, he neglects [Shelah's] duty to be one's brother's keeper, and he prefers the love of his own to the keeping of the law. The law of levirate marriage will surely strike the modern reader as a peculiar, even ugly and barbarous custom. . . . But if we are willing to set aside, for the moment, our current sensibilities, we may be able to discover, and even appreciate the principles that inform this ancient custom. For, details aside, the practice of levirate marriage seeks to uphold what is centrally important in marriage altogether. The heart of marriage, especially but not only biblically speaking, is not primarily a matter of the heart; rather, it is primarily about procreation and, even more, about transmission of a way of life. Husband and wife, whether they know it or not, are incipiently father and mother, parents of children for whose moral and spiritual education they bear a sacred obligation. . . . In levirate marriage, all these crucial principles are defended. A man serves, literally, as his brother's keeper: he refuses to allow his brother to die without a trace. Also, he refuses to nullify his sister-in-law's marriage, vindicating her claim to motherly fulfillment within her marriage. Taking seriously the commandment "Be fruitful and multiply," *levirate marriage elevates the importance of progeny above personal gratification, and*

hence, the importance of lineage and community above the individual.⁴ [Emphasis added.]

Indeed, upon being confronted by Tamar with the *eravon*, Judah realizes how wrong he really was, and becomes cognizant of the familial *arvut* he himself has abandoned. If Judaism is not named for its founder or greatest religious teacher, not for Abraham or Moses, but for Judah, it is, in part, because its first premise is essentially the lesson Judah learns. For when the Bible abruptly brings us back to Joseph, to his release from prison, and the famine that brings his brothers to Egypt, there, among the brothers—indeed, leading them—is Judah. He has returned to his family, he has rejoined his brethren. And when Joseph demands Benjamin, and Jacob resists, it is Judah who emerges as the embodiment of familial responsibility and brotherly bonds: *anokhi e'ervenu*. The familial obligations that I violated with Joseph, the bonds of blood that I sought to sever by abandoning my brothers—all that is over. I *am* my brother's keeper, and I shall be his surety! The word used by Judah is the same as the one used for the surety that he had given Tamar, noting that Judah has learnt well the lesson of the previous event. It is at this stunning moment that the two plots—the stories of Joseph and his brothers, and of Judah and Tamar—suddenly converge on each other, as we realize that these were not two stories but one, and one in which the main character may not be Joseph.

Judah's identification of himself as an *eravon*, a surety, a guarantor of his brother's safety, serves as an illustration for the talmudic maxim that all Jews are *areivin zeh ba-zeh*. Or, one might say, every Jew is a Judah. To be a Jew begins not only by affirming that the Torah was given by God, but also with the realization that one has been born into a family, and that every one of us is meant to come to the conclusion that Judah ultimately achieved: that no matter how much we can try, we are bound by blood and brotherhood to the other children of the patriarchs. To the modern Jew who seeks to sever himself from his roots, Judaism, by its very name, proclaims: You too are a Judah. You too are one who attempts to “go down from his brothers.” You too are one who has assumed, along with millions of members of modernity, that you can be whoever you want to be, that you are an unconnected

individual in free-floating space. But know that you are wrong. Were Judaism merely a movement, a collection of individuals, then one could undo Jewishness with a thought. The first tenet of *Yahadut*, in other words, is that it is more than a faith: It is a family. As such, it is aptly named for Judah, for the lesson that he learned, and for the bond of brotherhood that he ultimately embodied.

FROM *YEHUDIM* TO AN *AM MAMLEKHET KOHANIM*

For my grandfather, the very name by which a member of our people identifies himself indicates an unbreakable obligation to a particular people, a love for nation that is founded on familial identity. Yet at the same time, it is *this* nation, bound by blood and brotherly love, that is called to be an *am mamleket kohanim*, which, at least for Seforno,⁵ indicates a universal mission. “In this you shall be a *segulah*,” Seforno comments, “because you will be a nation of priests to understand and teach to the entire human race, so that they may all call in the name of God, to serve him together, as it is written, ‘And you, the Priests of God will call out.’” To be the priests of mankind obligates us to be ministers to humanity, seeking their moral, spiritual, and physical welfare. There are those who might assume that this duty conflicts with familial obligations as *Yehudim*, and that a priestly calling to those outside one’s immediate sphere outweighs one’s ever-present familial duties. Indeed, this is precisely what many Christians have argued regarding those they believe called to priestly duties, and why they have insisted on celibacy for the clergy. The notion of marriage hampering a priest’s pastoral role appears again and again in papal encyclicals. “A priest,” writes Pope Pius XI, “is to be solicitous for the eternal salvation of souls, continuing in their regard the work of the Redeemer. Is it not, then, fitting that he keep himself free from the cares of a family, which would absorb a great part of his energies?”⁶ His successor, Pius XII, in his encyclical *Sacra Virginitas*, insists that “spouses are to be bound to each other by mutual bonds both in joy and in sorrow.” As such, “persons who desire to consecrate themselves to God’s service embrace the state of virginity as a liberation, in order to be more entirely at God’s disposition and devoted to the good of their neighbor.”⁷ The

Second Vatican Council, which began after Pius's reign, reiterated in its statement *Perfectae Caritatis* that celibacy "frees the heart of man in a unique fashion so that it may be more inflamed with love for God and for all men."⁸

Judaism, in contrast, knows nothing of a celibate clergy, and some popes made clear in their writings that this evidences the Church's superiority. But the careful student of the *Tanakh* and Talmud understands that for Judaism, an insistence upon an unmarried state represents an ethical regression rather than the reverse, that having a preferential love for particular people makes one a more effective shepherd of one's flock on the whole, that having exclusive loves enhances, rather than detracts from, one's love of humanity.⁹ In other words, where the encyclicals extol celibacy as necessary for a truly effective clergy, rabbinic Judaism has long insisted the exact opposite: that those who have rejected familial responsibilities are *unsuited* for religious leadership. For the Church, family is a distraction from pastoral duties; for Judaism, family forms pastoral excellence.

Several examples illustrate this contrast. Papal encyclicals argue that those freed from the concern for wife and children can focus sufficiently to pray for humanity. Abstinence, Pius XII argues, "gives greater freedom to the soul which wishes to give itself over to spiritual thoughts and prayer to God."¹⁰ The Mishnah, on the other hand, insists that the *kohen gadol*, who represents the entire Jewish people in the *mikdash* on Yom Kippur, and asks for atonement on their behalf, must be married. Similarly, the Talmud informs us that in order to serve on the Sanhedrin, one first had to have children.¹¹ Where a priest might refrain from producing progeny in order that all the children in his parish may be his children, Maimonides argues that a member of the Sanhedrin *must* have children in order that he be merciful toward others.¹² *Kohanim*, in fact, were required to show a specific regard for their immediate family that they could not show other Israelites. Forbidden to attend most funerals, the Torah not only allows them to participate in the burials of their family—it obligates them to do so. In fact, for Maimonides, the obligation of a mourner to bury his own *karov* is deduced from the obligation of *kohanim* to be *metammé*

le-kerovim. In other words, for Jews, *kohanim*, and indeed all religious leaders, are role models of preferential love.

Why is it so important that a spiritual leader have familial, and not only communal, concerns? How does one make the case that the obligations of a husband and father weighing on the mind of a *kohen* do *not* distract him from his relationships with God and man, but rather are an essential ingredient in these relationships? And how can this help us better understand why Jews, called to be an *am mamlekheth kohanim* to the world, owe a still greater obligation to their own brethren?

AGAPE AND “SPECIAL RELATIONS,” SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY

Insight on this matter can be found in an article in the *Journal of Religious Ethics* by Julia E. Judish, titled, “Balancing Special Obligations with the Ideal of Agape.”¹³ Judish begins by suggesting that it is “undeniable” that a tension exists between *agape*, which she terms “an ethic of universal regard, a love of *all* neighbors,” and “special relations,” a love for those who “have preferential status based on their particularity.” It is the “recognition of these conflicting pulls,” writes Judish, that “has provided reason for Catholic priests to remain unmarried in order that they may most fully meet the demands of agape.” Judish seeks a strategy by which the two types of love can work in tandem. How, asks Judish, can a familial, preferential love inspire *agape*, a concern for outsiders, rather than detract from it? Citing a phrase from the theologian Gilbert Meilander, Judish argues that preferential love is a foundation from which one “builds up” to *agape*. As an example of how this would work, Judish provides the following story.

Judish’s grandmother, or “Nonni,” as she was known, fell in love with Judish’s grandfather at the age of sixteen, and, over the five-year courtship that followed, they saw each other every day: “Nonni would meet my grandfather on a trolley car, and they would visit together as he journeyed from his day job to night school, where he was training to be a metallurgist.” One night, while Judish’s grandfather was in chemistry class, a beaker exploded, blinding him. It was only ten days

later that the couple learned that his sight would return. “During those ten days,” Judish recounts, her grandmother “vowed that when she was able, she would do something with her life to help the blind.” Judish’s grandfather recovered and the couple married and raised a family; and in her spare time, Nonni learned to read Braille and devoted the rest of her life to transcribing hundreds of books and to helping the blind in countless other ways. For Judish, the story is not merely a familial anecdote; it is ethically illustrative in a profound way:

I tell Nonni’s story for a purpose. I am sure that my grandmother, like everyone, always knew that blindness is a terrible thing, but when that accident blinded my grandfather, whom she loved, she felt that knowledge. She gained an understanding, a deep and real understanding, of how awful blindness can be, because a person she loved became blind. That knowledge stayed with her and sustained her over thirty-five years of slow, laborious work. When she first began to transcribe books into braille, my grandfather had been recovered from that accident for years. Her work for the blind did not help him. It did not, in fact, help anyone she knew personally; requests for braille transcriptions would come from all over the country. Nonetheless, because she loved, in a deep and committed way, a unique, particular person, because she felt his suffering, she came to understand how any person who was blind might feel, and that understanding made her want to work to relieve their suffering.¹⁴

Judish’s point allows us to understand why Judaism asks its *kohanim* and clergy to found families, marry, and bear children before engaging in positions of leadership. Judaism insists on marriage and childraising because it insists that if we are to learn to love others, we must begin by loving those who are closest to us. Why, for Judaism, is preferential love so important? The answer lies in the distinction between sympathy and empathy. Judaism would argue that one who has no exclusive loves

cannot truly feel the emotional highs and lows experienced by one involved in these relationships. One who does not lie awake worrying about his own children can understand, but not fully empathize with, one who does; one who has not experienced the exclusive love that is marriage can understand, but not fully feel *with* another, the pain experienced by someone who has lost a spouse. Judaism therefore insists that both for the *kohen* and the layman, the experience of the family life is essential to truly understanding, and ministering to, humanity; rather than detracting from the love of others, it is essential to the very endeavor, for it is precisely the love for one's own that galvanizes him toward love of the outsider. As such, a prophet or pastor's love for his own children is the starting point toward cultivating compassion for other people's children. The case for celibacy appears to posit a choice between exclusive and expansive love, between special relations and *agape*, but this is a false choice. In Judish's words, "special relations are prior to *agape*, and one learns *agape* from them, and the universalist voice, once established, is truly a different voice— but neither voice obviates or overwhelms the other."¹⁵

This insight—that preference precedes universal concern, that preferential love is the foundation of *agape*—allows us new insight in the central rituals of Yom Kippur. The elaborate detail of the *avodah* of the *kohen gadol* embodies the extraordinary insight of Jewish ethics. As is made clear in the *maḥzor*, a complex series of confessions were recited by the High Priest on that day. He began by beseeching forgiveness for himself, and his family. Then the *kohen gadol* offered a confession, and prayer, for his fellow priests. Only after completing these confessions did the High Priest turn to the sins of the entire nation. The precisely ordered prayers are noteworthy. Here we have the High Priest on Judaism's holiest day, in Judaism's holiest site. All eyes are upon him as he represents his people before God. He begins by pondering his own imperfections, and his family's frailties, their need of mercy from the Almighty. He then "builds up" from there to ponder his extended family. The performance of the *kohen gadol* embodies a millennia-old insight that loving particular people in a preferential way enhances our understanding of the needs of others. As Judish writes, the fact that we

care more about our family “does not mean we are callous. In fact, the vulnerability of personal special relationships can teach us—or simply bring us—to feel a general love for all people.”

JUDAISM, UNIVERSALISM, AND THE “LOVE LEAP”

What is embodied by the hierarchy of relationships in the life of the *kohen gadol* is also made manifest in the hierarchy of concerns incumbent upon every member of the *am mamlekheth kohanim*. Bar-Ilan University Professor Ze’ev Maghen relates how he was once sitting in a restaurant in Tel Aviv when he heard that a plane crash in East Asia had killed hundreds of people. Utterly unperturbed, he continued with his meal. He then paused, thought to himself how he would feel if those killed were Israelis, and found himself without an appetite. It is preferential love for one’s own nation, he realized, that can lead to compassion for others:

Preferential love is the most powerful love there is, the only truly *motivating* love there is. It is by *means* of that love—the *special* love we harbor for those close to us—that we learn how to begin to love others, who are farther away. Genuine and galvanizing empathy for “the other” is acquired most effectively and lastingly through a process which involves, first and foremost, immersion in love of self, then of family, then of friends, then of community . . . and so on. It is via *emotional analogy* to these types of strong-bond affections that one becomes capable of executing a sort of “love leap,” a transference of the strength and immediacy of the feelings one retains for his favorite people, smack onto those who have no direct claim on such sentiments.¹⁶

This “love-leap” is precisely what the *kohen gadol* performs: from his immediate family to his extended family, and from there to all Israel. But it is also what Jews, the *kohanim* of the world, are called to embody. It is precisely the fact that Jews love their own so dearly that allows

them to desire the improved welfare of the world. To love everyone equally is to love no one truly at all.

In fact, in describing the day when all nations will have a covenantal relationship with *ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu*—a state of affairs that Jews, as an *am mamleket kohanim*, will have brought about—the *navi* stresses that this does not mean that all non-Jews will become part of the Jewish nation. Rather, Jewish eschatology envisions an age in which *Hashem ehad u-shemo ehad*, but countries are numerous, and national divisions remain:

On that day there will be an altar to the Lord in the midst of the land of Egypt, and a pillar to the Lord at its border. It will be a sign and a witness to the Lord of hosts in the land of Egypt; when they cry to the Lord because of oppressors he will send them a savior, and will defend and deliver them. And the Lord will make himself known to the Egyptians; and the Egyptians will know the Lord in that day and worship with sacrifice and burnt offering, and they will make vows to the Lord and perform them. And the Lord will smite Egypt, smiting and healing, and they will return to the Lord, and he will heed their supplications and heal them. In that day there will be a highway from Egypt to Assyria, and the Assyrian will come into Egypt, and the Egyptian into Assyria, and the Egyptians will worship with the Assyrians. On that day Israel will be the third with Egypt and Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the earth, whom the Lord of hosts has blessed, saying, “Blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria the work of my hands, and Israel my heritage.”¹⁷

Jewish eschatology, writes the political philosopher Daniel Elazar, depicts “what properly may be termed a world confederation of God-fearing nations federated through their common acknowledgment of God’s sovereignty and dominion, with Jerusalem, where all go up to worship God, as its seat.” Such a confederation, he further notes, is

fundamentally different from the Christian descriptions of an ultimate “ecumene that will unite all nations into one people. The biblical position has remained that of the Jewish political tradition ever since, in opposition to the ecumenical stance of much of Christianity.”¹⁸ Even as Judaism believed that one day God would elect the nations of the world as God did the Jewish people, nevertheless *Yahadut* insisted that the distinctions among the nations would never disappear, predicting a multiplicity among monotheistic unity. At no point will God’s covenantal love require that man declare the irrelevance of his heritage, of familial and national status. Though eventually all will be chosen, the distinction between nations remains, and the nations will serve God in the fullness of their humanity. Here, too, Judaism proclaims its belief that particularity is part of Judaism’s universal message.

CHOSENNESS AND THE MODERN ORTHODOX FUTURE

In response to the questions facing this Forum, I have briefly outlined how a dedication to *kelal Yisrael* can be emphasized without leading to a lack of concern for others, and indeed how exclusive love can help foster universal concern. I would add, however, that one of the central questions we ought to face is not only whether Modern Orthodoxy can foster among its adherents a concern for the world, but also whether the next generation of Modern Orthodox Jews will ably respond to the challenge that the world, and especially the academy, will present philosophically to the notion of Jewish peoplehood. It was Shlomo Carlebach who said that when he visited an American college campus, “I ask students what they are. If someone gets up and says, I’m a Catholic, I know that’s a Catholic. If someone says, I’m a Protestant, I know that’s a Protestant. If someone gets up and says, I’m just a human being, I know that’s a Jew.”¹⁹ It is in such an environment that the following questions will be put to Modern Orthodox students, by professors and students, Jews and non-Jews: Ought we not to love all human beings equally? Is not loving one’s own kin preferentially a form of xenophobia? Is not caring particularly for Jews on the other side of the world because of a blood kinship a form of bigotry, or racism? Is not Hebrew scripture’s notion of the nation state outdated? Would not the world be better off if divisions between countries were undone, if

decisions were made by the United Nations, or the International Court of Justice at The Hague, and we all became, to paraphrase President Obama's speech in Berlin, "fellow citizens of the world"?

It is to these questions that the next generation of Modern Orthodox Jews must be able to respond. In doing so, they must ably defend their Jewish identity not as a dialectic fraught with tension, but rather as encompassing a complementary hierarchy of obligation, a moral philosophy whose genius was wrongly ignored, denied, and derided throughout much of the history of ethical thought, and that the world today ignores at its own peril. It is no coincidence that the Abraham who desperately desired a son also pleaded passionately for Sodom, that the Moses who went out "among his brothers" also saved the Midianites at the well, and that the Isaiah who sought and strove for the *teshuvah* of his own brethren also longed for a day when all the nations would seek instruction from the mountain of the Lord.

This is a lesson that not just the world but many Jews have forgotten. In Judaism's estimation, when one claims to be without roots, to be nothing but a human being, he denies not only his particular identity but his very humanity. "Nothing could be more striking," notes Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, "than the fact that a people whose very reason for being in the past was to be different, chosen, particular, should today define itself in purely universalist terms, forgetting—surely not accidentally—that it is precisely in our particularity that we enter and express the universal human condition."²⁰ This is the perspective that the next generation must be able to argue; as *kohanim* to the world, they must be not only ministers of monotheism but also proud proclaimers of the genius of Judaism's moral message. Whether we will prepare them to deliver this message cogently and courageously remains to be seen.

NOTES

1. See David Luchins, "Rav Ahron Soloveichik zt"l," at <http://www.ou.org/notices/5762/rasoloveichik.htm>
2. See *Bereishit Rabbah* 98:6, s.v. *Yehudah attah yodukha ahekha*.

3. Michael Wyschogrod, introduction to the second edition of *The Body of Faith*, pp. xvii–xviii. Of course, I in no way intend to deemphasize the Jewish belief in *beḥirah ḥofshit*; one is absolutely free to choose whether to fulfill the Torah obligations that stem from one’s Jewishness. But one cannot choose to do away with those obligations, or to undo one’s Jewish identity.
4. Leon Kass, *The Beginning of Wisdom*, pp. 530–531.
5. Seforno, Exod. 19:6.
6. Archivio Centrale dello Stato, 45.
7. *Sacra Virginitas*, 20.
8. *Perfectae Caritatis* 12.
9. For a greater elaboration on this point, see my article “Rabbis, Priests and Wives,” *Commentary* (October 2007).
10. *Sacra Virginitas* 38.
11. Talmud *Sanhedrin* 94b.
12. *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhhot Sanhedrin* 2:3.
13. Julia Judish, “Balancing Special Obligations with the Ideal of Agape,” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 21, no. 1 (1998).
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–41.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Ze’ev Maghen, “Imagine: On Love and Lennon,” *Azure* 7 (1999): 155.
17. Isa. 19:19–25.
18. Daniel J. Elazar, *Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), pp. 118–119.
19. Quoted by Jonathan Sacks, “Love, Hate and Jewish Identity,” *First Things* (November 1997).
20. *Ibid.*