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It's a Small, Small World: Secular Zionism Through the Eyes of a Religious- Zionist *Parashat* *HaShavua* Pamphlet

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I always make it my business to be on time for *shaharit* on Friday mornings in my local Beit Shemesh synagogue. This is not out of devout piety, I admit, but out of a desire to make sure that I have access to the full range of *parshat hashavua* pamphlets which are distributed weekly in my synagogue, as they are in thousands of synagogues throughout Israel.¹ Were I to miss *minyán* on Friday morning and arrive even a few

minutes late for Friday *minhah*, I would, to my dismay, be left without the full selection of reading material.

Parshat hashavua pamphlets are much more than ways to share homiletical *divrei Torah* or *halakhic* decisions, because these pamphlets include political and social commentary on a range of issues, and they generally work to articulate a worldview and ideology for synagogue goers in Israel's complex society.² By placing these pamphlets in synagogues, publishers hope not only to circulate information, but to create public discourse, to influence the ideology and attitudes that help religious Jews construct their identities. *Parshat hashavua* pamphlets have emerged as an important alternative media for a Religious-Zionist community that feels, at least in part, alienated from the mainstream national media.³

In fact, *parshat hashavua* pamphlets may be Israel's fastest growing print media, and a journalist recently estimated that more *parshat hashavua* pamphlets are distributed than all of Israel's three major daily newspapers combined.⁴ A typical Religious-Zionist synagogue in Israel receives at least twenty different pamphlets each week, most produced by various Religious-Zionist groups but some by Habad or other organizations. These represent a small fraction of the total number of pamphlets produced on a regular basis in Israel by the entire range of Orthodox communities.⁵ For the most part, these pamphlets arrive early Friday morning to the door of the synagogue, distributed in bulk by a central distributor, though some can be brought by congregants, either on an ongoing basis or *ad hoc*.⁶ The free distribution, wide range of issues addressed, and the broad interest among synagogue goers make these pamphlets an important window through which to look closely at the various aspects of the communities that produce and consume them.⁷

This article will use these pamphlets to trace ideological trends within contemporary Religious-Zionism. This volume focuses on relations between Orthodox and non-Orthodox ideological groups, and therefore I will focus on a leading ideological camp within contemporary Religious-Zionism and how it envisions secular Zionism. In order to make this task manageable, I will confine myself to one particular pamphlet, namely *Olam Katan* [A Small World]. I could easily have

amassed almost identical sources (albeit in lower concentration) from other pamphlets identified with the “Rav Kook School,” such as *Rosh Yehudi*, *BeAhavah UveEmunah*, *Komemiut*, *Yesha Shelanu*, *Me’at Min HaOr*, or *Ma’aynei HaYeshua*. And the positions articulated in *Olam Katan* are shared by much of Religious-Zionism’s rabbinic and educational leadership. The position I will try to outline here reflects a significant if not hegemonic voice in contemporary Religious-Zionism.

I intend this as a kind of ideological snapshot of a particular moment in the ongoing saga of religious-secular relations within the Zionist movement. For that reason, I chose to focus on the most recent material I could find: those pamphlets that appeared between the spring of 2008 (when I was invited to attend the conference upon which this volume is based) and the end of the calendar year.⁸ There is nothing particularly surprising about what I am about to describe. Anyone following the internal discourse of Religious-Zionism in the past few years will find this description familiar, typical of what is being voiced in educational institutions, the Religious-Zionist press, and rabbinic sermons, at least within the leading, so-called *mamlakhti*⁹ wing of the “Rav Kook school.” For many North American readers, however, it may be novel and may shed more detailed light on the way Orthodoxy is playing itself out on the other side of the ocean.

Olam Katan began to appear in the Spring of 2004, in part as a response to the recently announced disengagement plan and a sense that the general media were no longer speaking to the concerns of the Religious-Zionist youth.¹⁰ Today *Olam Katan* is distributed in approximately 60,000 copies per week, near the top of the list of the most distributed.¹¹ *Olam Katan* is very popular, the first to disappear from my synagogue’s specially constructed “*parshat hashavua* pamphlets holder,” and the situation is similar in other synagogues.¹²

Olam Katan is both similar to and different from the other Religious-Zionist *parshat hashavua* pamphlets. Like the others, it appears weekly, distributed for free in Religious-Zionist synagogues throughout the country. Following a typical pattern, *Olam Katan* includes things that would be recognizable as Torah: homiletical interpretations of the weekly portion, *halakhic* information, and expositions of *hassidut*, for example.¹³ And, like other pamphlets, *Olam Katan* also

contains material of a political, social, historiographical, self-help, and ideological nature. In fact, *Olam Katan* stands out in the high percentage of the latter, more magazine-like content, including fiction, poetry, letters to the editor, youth-centered news, in addition to political and social commentary, remarks on current events, humor, and the like.¹⁴ Following the trend, *Olam Katan* is glossy, colorful, and attractive, combining text with photos and artwork, and its pages are covered with articles, photos, and eye-catching advertisements for Religious-Zionist educational institutions, cultural initiatives, books, wedding halls, clothing, and other businesses, without which *Olam Katan*'s publishers could certainly not afford to produce it week after week.¹⁵ Yet, *Olam Katan* is distinctive in its more colorful format and its large broadsheet pages, which make it seem that much more like a work of mass print media than a genre of traditional Torah literature.¹⁶

Still, the most important difference between *Olam Katan* and other *parshat hashavua* pamphlets is that *Olam Katan* is written for, and to a significant degree by, young adults.¹⁷ This youthful style is related to another aspect of its distinctiveness: the broad range of voices that appear on its pages. For the most part, authors, particularly of lead articles, reflect the mainstream of the educational and rabbinic leadership of the "Rav Kook school" in Religious-Zionism. Yet the editors of *Olam Katan* make it their business to include a range of voices and positions. On occasion, and with appropriate framing, *Olam Katan* quotes figures who do not identify with Religious-Zionism, or even with Orthodoxy, which, according to the editor, is in part an attempt to challenge Religious-Zionism to hear and respond to different voices on the Israeli scene.¹⁸ *Olam Katan* raises dispute and disagreement within the Religious-Zionist camp, allowing for point-and-counterpoint exchanges and letters to the editor in response to columns in the previous week.¹⁹ As we shall see, the youthful style of the pamphlet and its diverse body of writers allow for debate, conversation, and at times internal criticism of religious Zionism, all of which may help explain the pamphlet's popularity.

It is precisely *Olam Katan*'s youthful willingness to raise more than one voice that makes it such an intriguing window into the internal discourse of Religious-Zionism, both because ideas that repeat them-

selves and are not subject to significant debate can be safely assumed to reflect a certain ideological consensus and because multiple voices about issues make for a much richer description of Religious-Zionist ideology.²⁰ Even while disagreeing over certain details, the voices in *Olam Katan*—the authors, editors, letter writers, and advertisers²¹—share a certain collective ideological vision, one that is central in contemporary Religious-Zionist education and ideology.

Whatever the intentions of the creators and editors of *Olam Katan*, the notion of a “small world” neatly captures some of the tensions in contemporary Religious-Zionism and its relationship to secular Israel.²² Religious-Zionism is a “small world,” an isolated sector within the population, which, as I have argued elsewhere, has a great deal invested in isolation from general Israeli culture.²³ It wants to maintain its self-contained smallness out of fear of the big wide world out there. But the notion of a “small world” has another connotation as well. The world outside of the Religious-Zionist enclave is not as big and threatening as insiders might imagine. In fact, secular Zionism is small and weak. It is, perhaps, in its “death throes,” falling apart from the inside (*Olam Katan*, 181, p. 3). Secular Zionism is, today, so weakened that Religious-Zionist Jews can emerge from their small-world enclave and fix, transform, and conquer that small world of secular Zionism.

This narrative has emerged as central in contemporary Religious-Zionist ideology as part of a response to an ongoing crisis that developed during the years of the Oslo accords, reached a crescendo with the Rabin assassination, and has (as of this writing) culminated in the disengagement/expulsion. On an almost weekly basis, *Olam Katan* emphasizes things that fit with this alternative meaning of the expression “small world,” as the pamphlet works to motivate Religious-Zionist youth to go out and change the condition of contemporary Zionism.

Kookian Religious-Zionism and the Secular State: Some Background

Religious-Zionism has always had, and perhaps always will have, an ambivalent and conflict-ridden relationship with secular Zionism. On the one hand, the desire to live and settle in the Land of Israel is a matter of great religious significance for Religious-Zionists, as is the unity of *Am Yisrael*. On the other hand, Orthodox Jews in the mod-

ern era have always found it difficult to cooperate with non-observant Jews, a difficulty that is only extended when the secular side of the equation is the powerful majority, as it has been for almost all of Zionist history. This difficulty is magnified by the particular claims of secular Zionism. The notions that God rewards those who perform his commandments and that keeping *halakhah* is a prerequisite for living a good Jewish life were undermined by secular Zionist claims that an equal or better Jewish life could be lived without *mitzvot* and by that movement's success in creating a non-observant Jewish community in the Land of Israel.

Religious-Zionism has had many ways of addressing this challenge. In some cases, these tensions eventually created a break between the religious and the secular, as in the Netziv's decision to drop his association with the Hibbat Tziyon movement.²⁴ Others, such as R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Reines, diminished the conflict by arguing that cooperation with secular Zionism was largely disconnected from religion. Zionism is primarily a tactical movement designed to save Jewish lives and provide safety. Rav Soloveitchik took a more philosophical tack, distinguishing between a "covenant of fate," shared by all Jews and inviting cooperation between them, and a "covenant of destiny," where Orthodox Jews must go their own independent way.²⁵

But the writers and assumed readers of *Olam Katan* were brought up on a different vision, that of R. Avraham Yitzhak HaKohen Kook. According to his dialectical ideology, the secular Zionists were not "really" secular; they merely perceived themselves as such. Deep in an unacknowledged and submerged part of the secular Zionist collective psyche was a hidden religious motivation, one that is destined to emerge from its hiddenness and transform self-proclaimed secular Zionism into a messianic spiritual utopia.²⁶ But in the three quarters of a century since Rav Kook's death, that vision has not materialized. In fact, it certainly would have seemed more plausible to attribute secret religious motivation to the socialist-collectivist idealism of Second Aliya *halutzim* [pioneers], as did Rav Kook, than it would to attribute similar motivations to the citizens of contemporary Israel's increasingly individualistic and capitalistic society.

In the years following the Six Day War, much of Religious-Zionism, following the lead of R. Tzvi Yehudah Kook (son of R. Avraham Yitzhak), imagined that the Land, and Israel's miraculous conquest of that Land, would be the spark that would ignite the latent religiosity of the populace. Religious-Zionists would exemplify the classical Zionist value of *halutziut*, the pioneering spirit, and merge it with religion, in order to serve as a model for secular Zionism. The Territories were more than a place to live; they were a stage in the redemption, a way to unleash the latent spirituality inherent in the State.²⁷ But this, too, failed to materialize. The settlements grew, but they never became part of the Israeli consensus, and they did not succeed in bringing the rest of the Jewish nation to a renewed appreciation of the Land and its sanctity. Instead, they became the subject of hot political debate, with many Israelis viewing them as a political and moral burden rather than a stage in the redemption.

The sense that the secular population was growing alienated from the settlements and from all that they represented for Religious-Zionist ideology became worse with the signing of the Oslo accords (1993) and the gradual handing over of more territory to Palestinian control. Clearly, secular Israel did not see in the Land of Israel what the Rabbis Kook saw in it. In November 1995, with the Rabin assassination, an open rift developed between Religious-Zionism and a broad spectrum of the non-Orthodox population, with much of the general population viewing Religious-Zionism as a dangerous and potentially violent movement, and with the Religious-Zionist community defensive about its responsibility for the assassination (or lack thereof). These tensions reached a head in the summer of 2005 when the State of Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and several settlements in northern Samaria, forcibly removing the Jewish residents of these areas from their homes. This situation was made worse by a sense that only the Religious-Zionists seemed to care.²⁸ Under these conditions, on what basis can Religious-Zionism maintain its Kookian optimism about the future of secular Zionism?

Solving the Nation's Problems in Between *Aliyot: Olam Katan's* Diagnosis

The Kookian background and the disengagement color contemporary Religious-Zionism's diagnosis of the problems in contemporary Israel. The underlying crisis is not in Religious-Zionism itself, but in secular Zionism, which, it is claimed, has abandoned the classical Zionist values on which the State was founded—those very values that could have been transformed into genuine religiosity. Secular Zionism has abandoned love of Land and of People—things that reflect a dedication to ideals, to collectivism, to self-sacrifice—and replaced them with a selfish postmodern individualism.²⁹ “The secular population is sunk in a situation of complete escapism, which is the main reason that it was not aware of the human pain and the crisis [of the disengagement].... All the great ideas and ideals which characterized old-time Zionism are no longer a pillar of fire.... For many years, the secular population has not been very interested in spiritual and abstract visions, which have become the almost exclusive legacy of the Religious-Zionist community” (*Olam Katan*, 164, p. 4). The decision to withdraw from Gaza is reflective not only of misguided security considerations. It is symptomatic of a much deeper malaise: a misunderstanding of the “spiritual connections between the People of Israel and its whole Land,” indeed of the larger relationship between the “body and the soul, the spiritual reality that exists in every physical body” (*Olam Katan*, 165, p. 2).

This conception of contemporary secular life as selfish escapism, devoid of genuine values, appears in *Olam Katan's* fiction column in a short story about a young man who had left his Orthodox upbringing for a secular lifestyle. The story presents him sitting in a bar to pass the time, drinking beer after beer, trying to comfort himself after the end of yet another relationship with a short-time girlfriend. His life is utterly devoid of any transcendent meaning, and he has no significant goals. “Today is a new day,” he says, speaking to himself in third person, reflecting his self-alienation. “He will go to work, where he is very successful. He will forget everything. He will find a new girlfriend who will heal the wounds in his heart. He will return to the pubs in the evening to drink lemon vodka or a martini, to laugh with friends, to live

with women. He will forget everything and go back to living normally, without God or faith or other nonsense” (*Olam Katan*, 163, p. 8).

Olam Katan protests against a perceived attempt to imitate and borrow from contemporary “Western culture, which makes us pay a heavy price” (*Olam Katan*, 182, p. 1), rather than attempting to construct an authentic spiritual, Israeli-Jewish culture. For at least one author, Western culture is Judaism’s ultimate eschatological antagonist. The messianic war of Gog and Magog will occur when “the gentile cultures will instinctively understand that a republic of faith may sprout in the Land of Israel, [a republic] which stands in absolute contrast with their entire lives. [The gentiles] will gird their last strength for war.... In the first stage... Jerusalem will fail. Israeli culture will seem to be defeated by the overwhelming flow of foreign cultures.” In this context, at least some secular Jews are perceived as traitors. “In a flood of materialism, some of the nation will join the foreign armies.... [But] one part of the nation will not be taken captive and will maintain its position of faith” (*Olam Katan*, 173, p. 3; also see *Olam Katan*, 157, p. 3). Another author, equally dissatisfied with Western culture and secular Israel’s imitation of that culture, adopts a less confrontational attitude. There need not be an apocalyptic battle between Religious-Zionism and the West, because the West, after a period of crisis, will realize the emptiness of its own position. “Western culture will discover... that all of my [i.e., Western] world and all of my assumptions about God and man, about human nature and love, were all preposterous—‘Your Torah is true’” (*Olam Katan*, 135, 4).

Secular Zionist abandonment of its own values is particularly manifest in contemporary Israeli political culture, which is perceived as being selfish and short-sighted, in large part because of its lack of long-term religious vision. Then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is a target of particularly harsh attacks. His perceived lack of principles is viewed as symptomatic of a larger malaise within secular Zionism, and as contrasting with the idealism of Religious-Zionism. “We, the religious, are a ‘people’ [*am*] of principles.... Being principled is great because it means that you are an idealist. And sticking to one’s ideas is certainly better than to be a person who isn’t interested in principles.... Olmert is a Prime Minister who reflects most clearly the opposite... someone

without principles.... At the end of the day, his lack of principles will explode in his face" (*Olam Katan*, 159, p. 1).

Olam Katan also joins much of the rest of the religious community in Israel in attacking "the rot which has spread in the court system" (*Olam Katan*, 168, p. 1). Israel's judicial system is perceived as being anti-religious and left wing, the pinnacle of the post-Zionist secular elite that is stripping Israel of its original Zionist values.³⁰

Furthermore, the government's lack of dedication to land and to true Zionist values leads to the nation's socio-economic problems. A Religious-Zionist politician explains that "One who is prepared to give in and compromise on questions of policy [regarding land and security] is also likely to be 'socially' ineffective." That is why the Religious-Zionist parties, "the ones who care about the completeness of the Land," are also "effective, focused and dedicated just as much to caring for the weak and frail" (*Olam Katan*, 161, p. 3). Indeed, an article entitled "Citizens Instead of the Establishment" summarizes a year of Israeli social-justice initiatives by saying that "The overwhelming majority of the initiatives which developed here were initiatives of citizens and not the government" (*Olam Katan*, 171, p. 13).

The current Israeli establishment has reverted to an exilic "*galutiut*, model 2008" (*Olam Katan*, 135, 4). One short story compares the fates of three Jews, each named Yitzchak. In the first incident, Yitzchak owns an inn on a gentile nobleman's land, presumably in early modern Russia. The nobleman murders the poor and defenseless Jew when the latter cannot pay his taxes in a timely fashion. In the second, a heroic Yitzchak plans an ultimately fatal but still laudable attack against Nazi soldiers. In the third, Arabs kill Yitzchak, a contemporary Israeli reservist, when his officers refuse to allow him to take a pro-active stance in battle (*Olam Katan*, 160, p. 8). The contemporary government and defense establishment, it is claimed, have more in common with the *galuti* situation of the helpless innkeeper than they do with the heroic example of self-defense.

Contemporary Israel has replaced the classical Zionist collectivist ethos, which is to the liking of contemporary Religious-Zionism, with a new individualistic ethos. Writing about the dangers of an overemphasis on psychology, which focuses on the individual's comfort and satis-

faction, one article claims that, “Placing man’s psychology in the center is currently a force that is destroying the State, crumbling society, and destroying the family—and in the end will destroy the individual’s life” (*Olam Katan*, 173, p. 2). In a related article, the same author refers to the entire “cursed” field of psychology as a “modern heresy” for its “anthropocentrism.” It is the task of “religion” to “make its contribution to modern man by saving him from his self-centeredness” (*Olam Katan*, 169, p. 1). Several religious psychologists responded critically to this statement, but they did not question the notion that self-centeredness is a problem in Israel (*Olam Katan*, 170, p. 4).

But, Religious-Zionism as reflected in *Olam Katan* is also interested in distinguishing between the secular Zionist leadership, which is perceived as without values, and the masses, who are often described as being closer to the religious tradition than people think. The previously cited article that attacks Olmert for his lack of principles explains that the “masses” have a “divine intelligence,” which allows them to understand what their leadership does not. The task of the ideal “leader,” unlike the contemporary political leadership, is to “know how to unify the divine intelligence that is hidden in the masses who are below it [the leadership]... and then to know how to bring them one step at a time toward that lofty ideal” which makes up the destiny of the people (*Olam Katan*, 159, p. 2). One gets the distinct impression that this author envisions Religious-Zionism as just such a leadership, at least in potential.³¹

Several articles on the crisis in Sederot, the Israeli development town that was (and as of this writing still is) under threat of rocket attacks from Gaza, reflect these concerns. The primary problem is that “the State of Israel has abandoned them,” hinting at similar criticism of the government’s abandonment of those who were uprooted by the disengagement. “Try to understand the kind of craziness that the State of Israel maintains for its citizens.” Here, however, the problem is not only with the leadership but with the average citizen as well. “I don’t know how many of you have really internalized what is happening here in your own land, in your State, some two hour’s drive from your home.” One poster, copied in miniature on the pages of *Olam Katan*, juxtaposes a picture of young people casually drinking coffee in Tel

Aviv with a picture of an explosion in Sederot. The poster echoes an attack on secular Zionists during and after the disengagement, “those who sat in coffee shops and who avoided the horrible reality between sips of grande-American-latte which they drank in their Tel Aviv bubble” (*Olam Katan*, 154, p. 2).

Further to blame are the news media, which are described (quoting a secular left-leaning journalist and now politician Shelly Yichimovitch) as being “yellow journalism that works on the darkest urges by blurring the boundaries between a freak show and seriously addressing the issues” (*Olam Katan*, 171, p. 12). “The press can be run without ethics or integrity” (*Olam Katan*, 154, p. 4). “The media, with its roots in the West, emphasizes materialism and... makes self-realization the ideal goal,” rather than collectivism or Judaism (*Olam Katan*, 152, p. 4).

These media, in a fit of self-justification and abandonment of values, refuse to show the negative consequences of the withdrawal from Gaza and discourage attempts to fight for the sake of the Land and its safety. The media know how to “transmit pain and compassion when they really want to, but I do not understand why so often in Sederot the camera shows specifically people in the least sympathetic situation, how they manage in each report to spread the sense that ‘there is nothing to be done.’” The Religious-Zionist community is actually doing something about it, for the author of this article is the mother of “one of the ‘strong’ and idealistic families, those who are willing to sacrifice for the collective,” implicitly opposing the secular Zionist establishment which is said to be mired in individualism and selfishness (*Olam Katan*, 154, p. 2).

Another article decries the cultural dangers that are created because the army distributes secular newspapers, which color the news in their own secular-left fashion. Once the young and impressionable soldiers get accustomed to those papers, they develop reading habits that they then take with them into adulthood. Why, ask *Olam Katan* writers, does the army not distribute *Makor Rishon*, the Religious-Zionist newspaper that has attempted to reach the secular public? Perhaps the lack of high-quality, genuinely Zionist news media in the army is part of the reason why “the spirit of battle is not what it once was” (*Olam Katan*, 169, p. 3).

In this sense, *Olam Katan* perceives contemporary secular Zionism as a “small world.” It is weak, selfish, devoid of genuine values, and unwilling to sacrifice for the values that once motivated it. This bitter criticism of secular Israel reflects a growing Religious-Zionist alienation from contemporary Zionist culture, a sense that Israeli society is rotting from the inside. The question, then, is what to do?

Solutions

One possibility is to abandon the potential that Zionism might have presented, to join the Haredi ranks who openly reject Zionism as a movement and ideology, an option that has some appeal on the fringes of Religious-Zionism.³² But there is another option: to roll up one’s sleeves and begin the hard work of improving what is perceived as failing. The latter is the option that *Olam Katan*, and much of contemporary Religious-Zionism, advocates.

This tension between the two responses is reflected in two juxtaposed articles that envision Israel’s 100th birthday, in celebration of the State’s sixtieth anniversary. Well-known author, Smadar Shir—born into an Orthodox family but no longer Orthodox—parodies Israel’s future, envisioning it as contemporary secular Israel’s perceived failures writ large. “Curly Ortal” the clown leads the official Independence Day celebration, the guests of honor being a stupid beauty queen, a Jewish Israeli Holocaust denier, a woman from Sederot who finally leaves her bomb shelter to come to the ceremony, and a Minister of Education who is the only one in the crowd who speaks Hebrew. “Next year in Los Angeles,” declares the MC-clown.

This adult pessimism from the establishment is juxtaposed with the youthful optimism of the head of the Students’ Union in the town of Shoham. In forty years, Tel Aviv will be a green city, dotted with beautiful parks. Two million American Jews will have come on *aliya*, in search of Israel’s world-class educational system and to celebrate the national *Pesah* holiday. The entire land of Israel will be settled with Jews, except those parts that are left pure and pristine for hiking. This young woman entitled her essay “Lots and Lots of Work” (*Olam Katan*, 152, p. 4), implying that if only the youth do the work that they are

supposed to, then Israel has the potential not to become a disastrous dystopia but an ideal utopia.

For the youth to accomplish this, Religious-Zionism must break out of its isolationism. “Israel is a country of bubbles. The secular population and the religious population live in separate bubbles.... Religious Zionism... [did not realize] that the vision of the complete Land of Israel never settled in the hearts” of the non-religious population. It is a kind of cultural “autism on the part of the Religious-Zionist community” (*Olam Katan*, 164, p. 4). “The claim [that had motivated the early settler movements such as Gush Emunim] that revolutions can be motivated from a distance has disappeared from the world.” (*Olam Katan*, 162, p. 3).

Hence “The task of the Religious-Zionist community today is to raise up the Jewish [i.e., religious] foundation which is hidden in the recesses of Israeliness” (*Olam Katan*, 179, p. 4). And it must do so by breaking out of its isolationism. But the call, here, is for a particular kind of emergence and involvement. This is not integration in which one goes into the secular world to learn from the goodness that is there (as in the American Modern Orthodox discourse of *Torah UMadda*), nor is it the integration that comes from dialogue between equals. Indeed, religious-secular dialogue for the sake of honest communication and the finding of common ground is largely absent from *Olam Katan*’s rhetoric. Instead, *Olam Katan* advocates an attempt to go into that world as an evangelical, as a missionary.³³ Religious-Zionism must create a new Zionist culture that is closer to Zionism’s supposedly authentic religious roots. Religious-Zionism has, up to now, been satisfied to speak to Israelis about “small things,” but the Religious-Zionist community has not made any serious efforts to “change the Israeli discourse,” from one of pragmatic security to one of the integration of the physical with the spiritual (*Olam Katan*, 165, p. 2).

Indeed, the solution proposed in *Olam Katan* cannot come from secular Zionism, for both substantive and rhetorical reasons. Substantively, the lack of true Jewish and Zionist values makes it impossible for secular Zionism to solve its own problems. At least among the leadership, there are no longer enough secular Zionist values left for the implicit sanctity to emerge. Furthermore, at the rhetorical level, *parshat*

hashavua pamphlets are written for internal religious consumption, and they are not a forum through which to communicate with and influence secular Zionism.³⁴ In addition, focusing on Religious-Zionist activism reinforces the notion that no secular Jewish movement is really adequate and that only Orthodoxy can eventually succeed for modern Jews.

For some, the State of Israel is on the cusp of a youth-led revolution. “The generation that founded the State will be replaced by a new generation, and it seems that there will be a revolution on all the fronts.... Look [for the revolution] not among the adults, but rather among the fresh youth, who... [must] not stand around, but gird their loins and build the kingdom of God.” They will do so by replacing current secular decadence with something better, namely “pure Jewish courts and government” (*Olam Katan*, 168, p. 1).

That is, the crisis of the withdrawal ought to be used as a springboard for building and growing in new directions, in particular those directions that help secular Zionism heal itself from its recent failures. “Personal or sectarian pain [over the disengagement]... is important, but that is far from the point.... We are mourning also for those who don’t even recognize the seriousness of the act.... In the right measure and at the right time, [mourning] creates strength, demands new responsibilities.” And there are many, many tasks. Each person should choose “whatever lights him up—settling in the hearts [i.e., bringing the message of Religious-Zionism to the secular populations], settling on hilltops, studying Torah, purifying the court system, building a proper Israeli news media, to integrate or provide an alternative, to build the vessels of the Temple, or to distribute flyers in the streets” (*Olam Katan*, 165, p. 1).

One primary area of activism involves a Religious-Zionist attempt to “change the Israeli discourse.” Religious-Zionism is here not merely to fight for sectarian concerns but to re-envision what the State of Israel is all about. Religious-Zionism must teach the People of Israel that there is more to the Land than security. There is a “spiritual connection between the People of Israel and its complete Land,” which is representative of the wider connection between physicality and spirituality in the universe. “The Creator put us here for that very reason—to

combine the physical with the spiritual.” Changing Israel’s discourse is “a long and tiring process, in which, without concern for specific immediate consequences, we raise the spiritual factors to the discourse in the street and to the debates in Israel. We must write articles and give speeches.... We must get on radio programs and speak only about the physical-spiritual connection between the People and the Land” (*Olam Katan*, 165, p. 2). There is something ironic here. The notion that changing discourse can itself change reality is itself a Western, postmodern notion, which this Religious-Zionism claims to be repudiating.

Still, one way to achieve that goal involves a renewed commitment to go to the community of secular Jews and bring them closer to Torah and to Religious-Zionist values. “*Garinim Toranim*”—Religious-Zionist seed communities that are planted in secular or traditional neighborhoods to be agents of social and religious change—will be part of a movement of “local change” and can help bring about the desired revolution. “Ideas like ‘social involvement’ and ‘community influence’ have become part and parcel of the Religious-Zionist scene” (*Olam Katan*, 162, p. 3. Also see *Olam Katan*, 156, p. 4). Yeshivat Eretz Hemdah advertises its new “*Beit Midrash* for Community Rabbis.” This advertisement appears in the same issue as calls for young people to join a *garin Torani* in the largely secular and up-scale city of Hertzelia and to found new *garin Torani* in the poor development town of Natrat Elit (*Olam Katan*, 160, pp. 3-5. Also see *Olam Katan*, 154, p. 4). Even the University of Haifa, an institution that seems to have no interest in furthering the Religious-Zionist ideological and religious agenda, understands that it is likely to attract students from among the readership of *Olam Katan* by advertising an opportunity to establish a religious seed community that will be active in the university and in the largely secular (and Arab) city (*Olam Katan*, 158, p. 2).

One central part of this activism is the new movement of *hahzarah beteshuvah* that has become central in Religious-Zionist discourse in the past few years.³⁵ Linking the willingness to abandon territory in the Land of Israel with the secular nature of much of the population, one rabbi explains that, “If we strive to keep all parts of the Land of Israel... the center of our activities must be spreading *teshuvah* to each and

every house, family and individual in Israel” (*Olam Katan*, 168, p. 1). Similarly, an advertisement encourages students to “organize activities and study days for ‘secular’ youth on the topics of: heritage, identity, and Zionism” (*Olam Katan*, 162, p. 5). A yeshiva ties several themes together, when its advertisement calls on youngsters to join its ranks. “The People of Israel are getting lost, and you are busy with yourself!? Stop living in a movie!!! Become a trailblazer for the People of Israel! Join those who are creating a new yeshiva for outreach” (*Olam Katan*, 157, p. 4).³⁶

There is a critical difference between the way in which Religious-Zionism contextualizes its outreach and that of a typical Haredi *teshuvah* activist. For the Haredi community, on the whole, the goal is to bring an individual or family toward more serious and consistent observance of *halakhah* and toward a stronger identity with the Haredi community. But Religious-Zionism has broader goals. Drawing from another central theme in Rav A. Y. Kook, Religious-Zionism focuses its efforts not only on individuals but also on the broader field of culture. That is, Rav Kook combined a critique of what he saw as the decadence and immorality of some aspects of secular culture with an optimistic idea that Torah is capable of motivating art, literature, and culture that would express and expand Torah’s influence and fields of expression. As Rav Kook put it, “We shall transform all the positive aspirations of life—social and cultural, pragmatic and economic, esthetic and political—into a firm anchor of the Divine spirit and a radiant Torah that will shine forth from Zion.”³⁷ For example, an advertisement for a college with a special “religious track” attempts to attract students by inviting them to a conference on the topic of Jewish economics, claiming thereby to help “change the face of Israeli society” from one with a presumably more selfish economics to one that is to be more fair, caring, and holy (*Olam Katan*, 170, p. 4).³⁸

The goal, then, is not only to transform individuals, but to transform the entire cultural atmosphere. Hence, Religious-Zionist discourse celebrates numerous ways of creating cultural expressions that are specifically Jewish (*Yehudi* in Religious-Zionist lexicon—though at times the expressions *emuni* [faithful] or *Torani* [Torah-oriented] are used as well). The term *alternativah* [alternative] has become a kind

of catch-phrase in Religious-Zionist discourse, a term that connotes both the diagnosis of the collapse of Zionist culture as well as the task of Religious-Zionism to replace that culture with something better and more sanctified. Religious-Zionists are to go out into the places where Israeli culture is being constructed and create alternatives that are more holy, value-laden, Jewish, and content-filled. As R. Yisrael Rozen put it in a different *parshat hashavua* pamphlet, not long after the disengagement:

We will conquer the Israeli democracy from the inside by directing more and more worthy people to the media, to the courts, to politics, and even to art. When our influence will be measurable in these areas, as it is in the army today, we will prove that it is possible to lead a Jewish, Zionist, and democratic state.³⁹

The first and most important target of this agenda is the political sphere, since Israel is such a highly politicized and politically aware culture, and since one of the central manifestations of the proclaimed abandonment of Zionist values appears in political decisions such as land-for-peace deals or the withdrawal from Gaza. The “first” task of the religious parties, according to one author, is to “set up an overall *alternative* regarding the plethora of national issues which occupy us each and every day.” He blasts the existing Religious-Zionist political establishment for its narrow concerns and lack of vision. “You continue to play cheap parliamentary games when you should be directing and leading an entire nation. (A national *alternative*, remember!?)” (*Olam Katan*, 162, p. 8, emphasis mine).

Predictably, spokespeople for the Religious-Zionist political parties make it clear that this criticism is mistaken. This is so not because they disagree with the agenda, but because (as politicians tend to do) they claim that they are already fulfilling that agenda. “Despite the monotonous, endless and boring repetition ... that ‘We care only about the Land of Israel,’” this is merely “the media’s nonsense.” The Religious-Zionist politicians are active, of course, in the battle for the complete Land of Israel, but also, even more than the other parties, in social justice, the rights of the weak, the long-term educational infra-

structure, etc. etc., exactly those spheres in which secular Zionist politics has failed (*Olam Katan*, 161, p. 3, Also see *Olam Katan*, 152, p. 3).

Indeed, according to many authors, the religious community could, in the near future, send one of its representatives to the seat of the Prime Minister. “It is no secret that if the religious community in Israel would unify, they could lead the country” and win the elections (*Olam Katan*, 164, p. 2. Also see *Olam Katan*, 164, p. 5). One young man states explicitly that, “The minority can lead.” He calls on the Religious-Zionist political leadership to “Take the wheel of the country” (*Olam Katan*, 162, p. 8. Also see *Olam Katan*, 154, p. 5).

Not everyone agrees that the Religious-Zionist takeover of the secular political establishment is imminent.⁴⁰ One author rejects the notion “which has spread widely in our camp, that... it is enough that we [attempt to] take the leadership into our hands in order for them [the rest of the population] to support us” (*Olam Katan*, 163, p. 8). In part, this is true because Religious-Zionism has been too isolationist. “The separation” from Israeli culture “explains in the most simple way why until now a proper leadership has not developed from within the Religious-Zionist community, [a leadership] which can have an influence and take over political, policy and social leadership” of the country (*Olam Katan*, 165, p. 1). Even those who doubt the short-term possibility of religious political leadership claim, messianically, that, “In the long term we will certainly become the leaders. In the end we will win and in the end things will be fine” (*Olam Katan*, 159, p. 1).

More often than not, however, the goal is not to take over, but to influence, *lehashpiah*. An advertisement, for example, asks in big bold letters: “Do You Want to Have an Influence?”, hoping to draw young people in their twenties into an educational initiative to “strengthen Jewish values” outside of the devout Religious-Zionist enclave (*Olam Katan*, 158, p. 4). Another advertisement for a course of study in film and television asks young students to “Come and Have an Influence in the Media” (*Olam Katan*, 173, p. 3), without stating explicitly the narrative that lies behind the call to arms. Like *alternativah*, the term *lehashpiah* functions as a code for a broader collection of values—the desire of Religious-Zionism to change existing secular Zionist culture. This is precisely why a Religious-Zionist organization sponsors

a course in photojournalism and why it advertises that course to the youth who read *Olam Katan*—to help Religious-Zionist images reach the press (*Olam Katan*, 171, p. 15). In fact, the very publication and popularity of *Olam Katan* demonstrates that Religious-Zionists are capable of creating a weekly news and media magazine that reflects that community's values and concerns.

In addition to politics and the media, the creative arts are another important area where Religious-Zionism is meant to be “influential” by creating an “alternative.” *Olam Katan* advertises a “creative writing workshop” for up-and-coming Religious-Zionist writers (*Olam Katan*, 173, p. 4), and it publishes short fictional stories each week, which were collected into a book.⁴¹ An article on the “*Agadeta*” creative writing contest for Religious-Zionist authors explains that “literature” has a “great influence” on culture, and up to now the secular left has dominated that field. “It is critical that we raise the voice of Torah and the voice of roots and Zionism by developing the world of creative culture” (*Olam Katan*, 165, p. 7).

Advertisements for new religious theater, such as *Te'atron 'Amukah'* or *Yotzrot*, appear regularly (*Olam Katan*, 160, p. 7; 173, p. 6). Founders of a religious music festival see themselves as an alternative to the secular festivals, like “Boombamela” with its focus on “letting go... and drugs.”⁴² In contrast, the religious music festival “is a way of spreading Judaism.... The general community is longing for and very thirsty to hear good Jewish music.” Indeed, the organizers look forward to the day when general radio stations will start playing religious music as well (*Olam Katan*, 164, p. 3. Also see 166, pp. 2-3).

In order to influence the world of Israeli creative arts one needs proper training, and so *Olam Katan* advertises an institution of higher learning that combines “academic studies with a *beit midrash* for dance, drama and Jewish art” (*Olam Katan*, 162, p. 3). Alternatively, one can learn a useful profession while helping to transform the decadence of contemporary Israeli fashion by attending a “*Fashion Midrashah*” or another course in clothing design (*Olam Katan*, 172, p. 7; 173, p. 5; 162, p. 7, among others. Also see *Olam Katan*, 166, p. 1).⁴³

The agenda spelled out in *Olam Katan* is, for the most part, *mamlakhti*. That is, despite the disengagement, the State of Israel remains

the legitimate representation of the Jewish people, and Religious-Zionism must continue to maintain its positive relationship with the State, its culture, and its institutions (*Olam Katan*, 152, p. 4). There is also an anti-*mamlakhti* camp within Religious-Zionism, though it is considerably smaller, and the anti-*mamlakhti* position retains a certain pull for some *Olam Katan* authors, particularly regarding the anger about the disengagement. “Behold you are divorced from me/ with this strangling ring/ according to the law of Ehud [Olmert] and Ariel [Sharon],” declares one poem (*Olam Katan*, 165, p. 8).⁴⁴ In addition to anger, however, some of this attitude reflects a concern that Religious-Zionism will lose the advantages that isolationism holds for religious Orthodoxies. For all the proclaimed desire to integrate into the existing establishment in order to change it from the inside, there is an equally powerful pull toward the safety and religious purity of the isolationist enclave, particularly in the wake of the traitorous disengagement.

An anonymous editorial regarding the third anniversary of the withdrawal reflects on this very tension, suggesting a compromise. The *mamlakhti* camp, it claims, suffers “suddenly from an inability to criticize or even raise the most natural feelings of disappointment and anger, which should be the portion and right of someone who sees himself as part of a body, a family and a State.” The non-*mamlakhti* camp, in contrast, succeeds in expressing the legitimate feelings of criticism and anger, but in its rejectionism and isolationism it fails “to take true responsibility for this creature which is called the State of Israel.” In fact, the respective failures of both camps “explains in the simplest way the failure of the nationalist, Religious-Zionist camp [to produce] a proper leadership which will have influence and take political, policy and spiritual leadership” over the rest of the country. The new Religious-Zionist youth, in contrast to the older generation, is now finding the right balance. It knows when to attack and criticize and remain distant, but it also remains attached and involved enough to change what needs to be changed. This Religious-Zionist youth “knows that it is an important, indeed a critical and dominant part, of the developing puzzle that is reaching completion” (*Olam Katan*, 165, pp. 1-2).

The rhetoric in *Olam Katan* is particularly interested in celebrating signs of success. “Now that the Zionist ethos... is no longer burn-

ing in the way that it was... a vacuum has been created.... Certain [non-Orthodox or non-Jewish] initiatives are, here and there, filling this emptiness... but they do not have the ability to satisfy the soul. Look at what is happening in the secular world regarding spiritual searching—more and more people are turning to Kabbalah or the Far East.” But these kinds of searches, according to Religious-Zionist rhetoric, cannot satisfy non-observant Jews, who, in their heart of hearts, are looking for a genuine Religious-Zionist Orthodoxy. “These people want a synagogue with everything that that implies. And here the Religious-Zionist community can offer something unique” (*Olam Katan*, 164, p. 4).⁴⁵ A short poem by an anonymous woman from Tel Aviv—a city that symbolizes the heart of the secular establishment and the place where *teshuvah* efforts have been particularly pronounced—celebrates the supposed secular return to Judaism. “I came from the black/ and I returned to the light.... I was here and I heard/ and returned [*hazarti*] greatly. Now I am here/ remaining forever/ with the never ending light” (*Olam Katan*, 154, p. 8).

Similarly, *Olam Katan* emphasizes non-Orthodox Israeli artists and celebrities who use their talents to “reconnect” with the tradition. The music review section of *Olam Katan* celebrates albums by mainstream, non-Orthodox Israeli artists such as Ehud Banai, Meir Banai, and David D’Or, whose music has been influenced of late by traditional Jewish sources (*Olam Katan*, 173, p. 6). Similarly, Shuli Rand, the now Breslover Hasid (he was born into a Religious-Zionist family and was secular for a time) perhaps best known for his Israeli-Oscar winning performance in his movie “*Ushpizin*,” released an album that “nobody questions is completely ‘a song to God,’” and which sold enough copies to become a “Gold record” (*Olam Katan*, 164, p. 3). An advertisement invites Religious-Zionist youth to attend one of Rand’s concerts in the well-known Tzavta concert hall in Tel Aviv, not a place known for its religious atmosphere, under the direction of secular rock star Asaf Amdursky (*Olam Katan*, 168, p. 1).⁴⁶ Most prominently, a more than two-page spread contains an interview with Amir Benayoun, a popular singer who has become more observant over the course of his career, and whose lyrics reflect an appreciation of and love for traditional Jew-

ish texts and liturgy. That his music has been appreciated by Israel's musical *branzha* [snobby elite], and that it gets significant playing time on Israeli radio, contrasts, according to *Olam Katan*, with the mindless music of other popular singers and reflects the tremendous possibilities of cultural influence (*Olam Katan*, 171, pp. 8-10).

On the whole, many of the Religious-Zionist spokespeople in *Olam Katan* are convinced that this agenda of cultural revolution will succeed. It is only a matter of time. In the not too distant future Israeli culture "will no longer be 'Israeli.' Nor will it be secular in the sense that that term is used today. In historical terms, this [secular Israeli culture] cannot survive. Nor will it be 'religious' in today's sense of the term. The secular Zionist Israeliness of today and the 'religious' Zionism of today will combine into something genuinely new. This will be a Jewish culture... the culture of the Third Temple" (*Olam Katan*, 152, p. 4).

Internal Tensions and Contradictions

This agenda is not without its problems. One longtime problem involves the paternalism in this approach. Religious-Zionism is convinced that it knows that secular Zionism is really religious, knows where secular Zionism has gone wrong, and knows how to fix it. To quote one of the more explicit and extreme voices, "Secular Zionism has gone bankrupt, and they see that Religious-Zionists are the ones who are succeeding... It all depends on us" (*Olam Katan*, 181, p. 3). Secular Zionism has long critiqued the implicit paternalism in Rav Kook's notion that he knows self-proclaimed secular and atheistic Zionists better than they know themselves. Indeed, critics from within Religious-Zionism have attacked this paternalism as being immodest and arrogant.⁴⁷

In addition, there are other problems with the Religious-Zionist attempts to transform secular Israeli culture, because one becomes dependent on the internal logic of the outside culture. When one sets out to create an alternative to an existing secular media, one has no choice but to follow at least many of the codes, concerns, and values that are inherent in that media. If one wants to create a new, better film

culture, then one must produce film, and that film must be attractive by the standards of the genres and by the economic forces of the open market. And what these forces demand may not match what religious values deem ideal.

This issue also came to the fore in an exchange on the pages of *Olam Katan* regarding the alternative “religious” newspaper *Makor Rishon*.⁴⁸ One anonymous author celebrates its successes. “When I see a newspaper like *Makor Rishon*, I am happy because [it shows] that it is possible to create a proper Israeli press.” It is not just for the *migzar* [in-group]. It “listens to the world outside of the courtyard but makes sure not to let in too much of the dirt” (*Olam Katan*, 157, p. 1). For at least one reader of *Olam Katan*, however, even *Makor Rishon* is inadequate. “*Makor Rishon* is just not a newspaper that meets [*halakhic*] standards. Reading most of this newspaper is simply prohibited according to *halakhah* just as reading any other secular newspaper is prohibited” (*Olam Katan*, 159, p. 6). Immodest pictures, reviews of upscale restaurants, real estate sections without enough focus on the settlements, *lashon hara*, and focus on sports stars are all inappropriate, “to mention nothing of the monthly section for women that violates all basic rules of modesty” (*Olam Katan*, 159, p. 6).⁴⁹

This attack on *Makor Rishon* led to a backlash. Yes, the paper is “not perfect,” but one cannot “wish the paper great success, hoping that it will become the ‘country’s newspaper,’ and at the same time call to cancel one’s subscription. You want something pure and clear, with no dilemmas and problems? You can remove the sports section, the financial pages, the entertainment, and the analysis. You can replace it with *parshat hashvua* and articles about *halakhah*. You can replace the ‘secular’ name *Makor Rishon* with a more ‘Jewish’ name like *Shabbat Kodesh*, make the format smaller, and distribute it in synagogues. Then we can read it comfortably during prayers and continue to cry, with absolute justification, that the media, and following them the nation, is against us” (*Olam Katan*, 160, p. 8).

The example of *Makor Rishon* points to another challenge inherent in the attempt to create an alternative to the secular culture. One may produce a religious alternative not in order to influence the secular, but in order to prevent religious people from consuming the dangerous

secular culture. Rather than influencing secular culture, it may become part of a isolationist religious culture, preventing contact between Religious-Zionists and others. After praising *Makor Rishon* for its quality, “Jewish” reporting, one author in the discussion of the newspaper asks, “Why, despite all the efforts, has *Makor Rishon* not succeeded in really breaking out into the secular and traditional sectors? Why, in the radio’s summaries of the morning newspapers, is it not there on the table? Perhaps it is a marketing problem, perhaps it is a secular conspiracy, and perhaps there is a deeper problem” (*Olam Katan*, 157, p. 1). Similarly, as the lead singer of the “religious” band, *Oyf Simkhes*, put it, the rock-star status of Orthodox musicians is problematic from a Torah perspective, but without the religious alternative the youth would be “pushed into the arms of the playlist of [the secular music station] Galgalatz” (*Olam Katan*, 166, p. 4).

Indeed, as Yonatan Cohen has argued, part of the very success of *parshat hashavua* pamphlets in the religious world involves a desire to create a separate, isolationist media, due to religious dissatisfaction with the secular media. An individual might read *Olam Katan*—or other print media with a similar agenda, such as *BaSheva*, *Nekudah*, or other *parshat hashavua* pamphlets—only to cancel his subscription to the now redundant non-religious current events magazine. *Olam Katan* and like publications preach the value of emerging from the Religious-Zionist enclave to have an impact on, among many other things, the print media, at the same time as those publications hope to replace for the Zionist readership some of the print media that they are meant to influence.⁵⁰

But there is also significant reason to believe that the isolationist function of Religious-Zionism’s thick culture is not entirely successful. Many readers of *Olam Katan*, ones who in principle largely agree with its agenda, are fans of the same culture that they claim to want to influence or replace. The youth of that community are extensive consumers of secular Israeli and international popular culture.⁵¹ *Olam Katan* as much as admits this when it celebrates the secular musicians who turn to the tradition, assuming a readership familiar with and accustomed to that music.

Furthermore, even when a Religious-Zionist cultural product

does succeed in crossing over, does succeed in creating something that is consumed by the secular public, it may not play the role that the ideologues originally desired. Take the controversy that arose regarding “*Serguim*,” the popular television series that tells a story of several young, single, religious people from Jerusalem. The program was developed by Eliezer Shapira, a graduate of the Ma’aleh film school, a school that was founded, at least in part, to train young religious people to create an alternative to the perceived decadence of Israeli entertainment culture. On the surface, this is precisely what ideologues associated with *Olam Katan* would like: a religious-created program that could cross over and become popular among the general population. Despite this potential, the show did not meet the standards of at least some of the religious and rabbinic leadership.

R. Shlomo Aviner explained on the pages of *Olam Katan* that watching the program is “certainly prohibited. There is inappropriate language and immodesty.... It is cheap, shallow, stupid, and an embarrassment to the Religious-Zionist public” (*Olam Katan*, 168, p. 1). Another article blasts the show for its lack of realism and the lack of *halakhic* behavior by its protagonists. “*Serugim*,” it is claimed, paints a false and misleading picture of the religious and social lives of the Religious-Zionist public,⁵² making secular Jews think that the Religious-Zionist community as a whole is uncommitted and shallow. Another writer goes so far as to place the Religious-Zionist producer of the program outside of the camp. “We didn’t ask *you* to cover over *our* weaknesses.... Just don’t portray *us* using *your* old stigmas” (*Olam Katan*, 170, p. 4, emphasis mine).

The Religious-Zionist community began to train its youth to be cultural producers for the larger public but soon discovered that the skills that these youth developed could be used in directions other than what the ideologues demanded. The show’s co-writer and developer wanted to present Religious-Zionist singles—of which he is one—in a way that he saw them (and in a way that would turn a profit). In an interview in the secular press he explained that “We do some scandalous things with provocative issues, but we do it well. It’s not giving in to ratings. It’s serious issues, in the cleanest and most modest way.... No one wants to make a PR movie about religious people.... The result

[of making the series the way I saw fit] is more identification.”⁵³ Literature, film, and the arts rarely remain in the confines that the ideologues would like, at least in an open society where individuals are free to ignore the ideologues and where the forces of the market are often stronger than the forces of the preachers.⁵⁴

But writers in *Olam Katan* remain “confident” that despite “*Serugin*” and its shortcomings, “Many of those who wear knitted *kippot* have not yet picked up the gauntlet of proper Jewish creativity, one for which we have waited for two thousand years. I am convinced that there is ... an authentic Jewish creativity that does not kick at the tradition and submission to God, but [which] ... will create new fruits that have not yet existed in the world. But it seems that we will just have to wait a little while” (*Olam Katan*, 169, p. 2).

Some Concluding Questions

The mainstream Religious-Zionist ideology that is reflected in *Olam Katan* is not the only Orthodox voice in Israel working to articulate a stance toward the secular Zionist cultural establishment. If Haredi *teshuvah* activists also envision bringing the secular closer to Judaism, they expect to do so on a case-by-case, individual-by-individual basis. They certainly have no willingness to train their own youth for work in the secular cultural mainstream.⁵⁵ The more left-wing elements of religious Zionism do not share with *Olam Katan* the fierce criticism of secular Israeli culture, and therefore have less invested in replacing it.⁵⁶ There is also a rather large group of ideologically unself-conscious middle class Religious-Zionists who are so integrated into Israeli general culture that they have little motivation to transform it.⁵⁷

In contrast, *Olam Katan* and the influential ideological and educational group which it reflects have set for themselves a rather large task of transforming Israeli culture from the inside. And there are, in fact, signs of an increased presence of religion in Israeli public life. Certainly, the appearance of religious journalists such as Sivan Rahav-Meir on Israeli television; movies such as “*Medurat HaShevet*” and “*Hesder*” by the graduate of the religious school system, Yosef Cedar; the success of the fiction of R. Hayyim Sabato; art galleries with shows by artists such as Tzvi Malnovitzer; the “Judaism” sections on the websites of Israel’s

two largest newspapers (*Yediot Aharonot* and *Ma'ariv*, www.ynet.co.il and www.nrg.co.il respectively); the publication of the winners of the “*Agadeta*” fiction contest on the website of *Yediot Aharonot*;⁵⁸ the activism of Religious-Zionist *teshuvah* organizations such as Rosh Yehudi; and many similar things all point to ways in which religious voices are making their way out of the enclave,⁵⁹ though I am not convinced that all of this is entirely a result of Religious-Zionist activism. I will make no attempt to predict how far this trend might go and how close Religious-Zionism might get to achieving its goals.

But I would like to suggest that Religious-Zionism’s cultural agenda is not only about fixing the perceived faults in secular Zionism. It is also, and perhaps primarily, an internal discourse, a conversation that helps Religious-Zionism negotiate its identity crisis in the wake of the Oslo agreement, the Rabin assassination, and the disengagement. That is, in addition to looking at what *Olam Katan* criticizes about its community’s practice, it is also worth examining what is out of bounds for *Olam Katan*, what aspects of Religious-Zionist ideology are not questioned. Religious-Zionists did not do an adequate job of communicating their values to the secular public and did not put enough energy into other transformative cultural endeavors. It is time to change that approach. But several aspects of Religious-Zionist ideology are not subject to question by authors and editors, most apparently the messianism and the centrality of the settlement movement. Indeed, the editor of the pamphlet agreed in conversation that he did not want to challenge those aspects of Religious-Zionist ideology.

That is to say, according to this ideology, Religious-Zionism’s faults were primary ones of omission rather than commission. It is not that the messianism or settlement ideology was mistaken or misguided. It is that Rav Kook’s prediction of the sanctification and religionization of Zionism has not yet panned out and that the secular establishment did not come to appreciate the Religious-Zionist sacrifices for the sanctity of the Land. But they will. It is only a matter of time, and perhaps an additional kind of activism on the part of Religious-Zionist youth. The ideology that Religious-Zionism has been proclaiming for decades remains fundamentally correct and coherent; it merely needs an addition.

Hence, the ideology articulated in *Olam Katan* diminishes Religious-Zionism's blame for recent failures by focusing on the faults of secular Zionism, which has failed to live up to its own values and now needs Religious-Zionism to save it from itself. It is not Religious-Zionism that has failed, that misread the map, that went off in wrong directions. It is secular Zionism that has become derailed. In the words of one particularly alienated youth, "We are the only ones who have real values in this country" (*Olam Katan*, 181, p. 3).

Further, this ideology leaves Religious-Zionism in the center of history. The disengagement does not call into question Religious-Zionism's self-perception as the axis around which messianic history rotates. It merely requires shifting the angle of that axis. In the language of Thomas Kuhn, the fault lines in post-disengagement Religious-Zionism do not require an ideological paradigm shift, but some restructuring of details and priorities.

That is to say, what *Olam Katan* leaves out of the conversation is also a way of limiting the identity crisis that has emerged in the wake of the Oslo accords and the disengagement. *Olam Katan* is willing to criticize its community, but its ideology also absolves Religious-Zionism of a need to rethink certain core aspects of its previously stated ideology, and it frees Religious-Zionism of responsibility for its failure to accomplish some of its goals. Critics from within and without Religious-Zionism have, for some time, suggested that activist messianism can lead to irrational policy by encouraging an exaggerated self-confidence and a sense that failure is impossible. Furthermore, critics claim that the focus of so much of Religious-Zionism's resources on settlements is a prime example of just such an irrational messianic policy. Or, put somewhat differently, Religious-Zionism's settlement focus and its messianism may bear more of the blame for its own problems than *Olam Katan's* rhetoric is prepared to admit. Perhaps the disengagement has many reasons beyond a supposed collapse of secular Zionist values. I, for one, have much sympathy for this critique, but the rhetoric and ideology expressed in *Olam Katan* do not engage those possibilities. This can push the discussion to a more comfortable place, one in which Religious-Zionism retains the historical, ideological, and national high ground.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Eliezer Finkelman, Kalman Neuman, Jeffrey Saks, Yonah Goodman, Neri Levi (an editor of *Olam Katan*), David Shatz, and the participants at the Forum for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. In particular, my thanks to the organizers of the Forum whose invitation helped change my Friday night habit of reading pamphlets from the status of *averah lishmah* to a mere *mitzvah haba'ah be'averah*.
2. Yosef Russo, editor of *Olam Katan*, said so explicitly in a telephone interview on December 29, 2008. On these pamphlets as alternative news media see Jonathan Cohen, "Politics, Alienation, and the Consolidation of Group Identity: The Case of Synagogue Pamphlets," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 3:2 (2000): 247-275; and idem, "Itonut LeHatzvi HaAm," *Panim* 1 (January, 1997), available at <http://www.itu.org.il/Index.asp?ArticleID=1102&CategoryID=494&Page=2>, viewed Oct. 15, 2008. Also see R. Yisrael Rozen, "Synagogue Pamphlets or Family Magazines," *Shabbat BeShabbato* 1245 (Bereishit, 5768), last page.
3. On Religious-Zionist attitudes toward the mainstream media, see Einas Gevel, *HaTzibbur HaDati Leumi VeHaTikshoret: Yahasei Ahavah Sinah* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2006).
4. Kimmy Caplan indicates that the first pamphlet appeared in 1975 but that the flowering of the genre began in the late 1980s. Stuart Cohen, in this volume, points to the military synagogue pamphlet *Mahanayim* as a precursor in the 1950s and 1960s to the phenomenon. Today there are over 100 pamphlets. Yitvat Weil claims that 1.5 million copies of *parshat hashavua* pamphlets are distributed weekly, but that is the same number suggested by Cohen, writing ten years earlier. I have little doubt that the number of pamphlets and the total number of copies is higher today than those estimates even from a few years ago. Caplan claims that there are probably more copies of *parshat hashavua* pamphlets distributed in synagogues each week than there are actual synagogue goers. See Ettinger, "Mi Amar SheHaItonut HaKetuvah Gosseset," *Ha'aretz*, April 1, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=844617>, viewed Dec. 10, 2008; Kimmy Caplan, "Alonei Parshat HaShavua BaHevrah HaYehudit HaOrtodoksit BeYisrael," in *Sifriot VeOsfei Sefarim*, ed. Moshe Slochovski and Yosef Kaplan (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2006), 447-482. Yitvat Weil, "HaHavayah Me'atzevet Et HaHakarah," *Eretz Aheret*, (May-June, 2008), 48-53.
5. In a typical week, my synagogue receives *parshat hashavua* pamphlets associated with Religious-Zionism's ideological right wing: *Shabbat BeShabbato*, *Komemiut*, *Yesha Shelanu*, *Rosh Yehudi*, *BeAhavah UveEmunah*, *Me'at Min Ha'Or*, *Ma'aynei HaYeshua*, *Talmei Ge'ulat Am Yisrael*, *Sivan* (aimed specifically at women), as well as the pamphlet to be focused on here, *Olam Katan*. We also receive pamphlets with a somewhat more liberal bent (*Shabbat Shalom*, *Matzav HaRuah*, *HaShabbat Tzohar*, and *Shabbaton*, the latter sponsored by the tourism industry and sporting many advertisements for organized tours to Europe and the Far East); a one-page pamphlet sponsored by the Religious-Zionist construction company

Mishav; several associated with Habad (*Sihat HaShavua* as well as *Eretz Yisrael Shelanu*, an extreme politically right-wing voice with close ties to Habad). Two more pamphlets, specifically for children, are designed to facilitate child-parent study and are distributed by the organization *MiBereishit*. *Shalom La'am*, a small-format pamphlet, is also designed for children. *Me'orot HaDaf HaYomi* deals with the upcoming week's *daf yomi* learning, while the short-lived *Zug O Pered* focused exclusively on issues of dating, marriage, and family life. Other pamphlets appear less regularly, such as *Derekh Emunah*, *Siah HaSadah*, *Nahalei Ba-Gad*, *Et Lidrosh* (sponsored by the liberal Orthodox group *Ne'emanai Torah VaAvodah*), *Ezri Me'Im HaShem* (for a particularly *tzedakah* organization), *Kolekh* (sponsored by the Orthodox feminist organization of the same name), and the more academic *HaDaf HaShevui* (sponsored by Bar-Ilan University). On occasion there are others, sometimes associated with particular *yeshivot* or institutions, or from followers of Meir Kahana, though they come and go by the week. On occasion, publishers use the centralized distribution to leave copies of ideological pamphlets, *halakhic* literature, or propaganda of other kinds in synagogue lobbies. Sometimes the pile of weekly pamphlets also includes advertising circulars or political propaganda without any *divrei Torah*.

Shabbat Shalom, messianic Habad pamphlets, and Bar-Ilan University's pamphlets appear regularly but are generally absent from the central distribution, either because they are unwelcome on ideological grounds or because lack of advertising keeps them out of the centralized distribution. The OU Israel Center's *Torah Tidbits* is distributed exclusively in English-speaking neighborhoods throughout Israel and has a different, but well-organized, distribution system. Over forty *parshat hashavua* pamphlets can be downloaded at <http://balevavot.ios.st/Front/NewsNet/reports.asp?reportId=222778>, viewed Nov. 22, 2008. The religious-Zionist website *kipa* publishes a weekly summary of the *parshat hashavua* pamphlets, <http://www.kipa.co.il/jew/show.asp?id=30516>, viewed Dec. 11, 2008. The left-wing Religious-Zionist group *Tzionut Datit Re'alit* for a time produced a weekly internet column criticizing perceived errors in fact and judgment in the previous week's *parshat hashavua* pamphlets. See <http://www.tzionut.org/RRL.asp>, viewed Dec. 10, 2008.

6. This centralized distribution is coordinated with a handful of advertising agencies which serve as intermediaries between advertisers, editors, and readers. It seems likely that these agencies earn the most profit from this endeavor, which explains their interest in coordinating circulation. The centralized distribution seems to be a recent development, since Caplan reports that as of seven or eight years ago most of the distribution was conducted by mail. See Caplan, "Alonei," pp. 458-460.
7. While such pamphlets exist in North America, there are many fewer. They tend to be locally produced and generally focus more exclusively on traditional genres of Torah and less on the more magazine-like content of the Israeli versions. This focus is related to the fact that current events are seen as less religiously loaded in

North America; to the centrality of local communities rather than national communities; to the difficulty of mass distribution; and to the lack of advertisers to pay for the endeavor.

The popularity of *parshat hashavua* pamphlets does not mean that all are perfectly satisfied with either the medium or the message. The pamphlets are seen by critics as a shallow distraction from prayer, overly commercialized, too political, sources of extra work for *gaba'im*, and sources of mounds of extra *genizah*. See, for example, Udi Mikhelson, "*Makat HaAlonim*," <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3384565,00.html>, viewed Dec. 11, 2008, and Yisrael Rozen, "Synagogue Pamphlets or Family Magazines," *Shabbat BeShabbato* 1245 (Bereishit, 5768), last page, as well as Caplan, "*Alonei*," pp. 462, 465.

8. More precisely issues 151-183, from the end of *Pesah* through the end of December 2008. With the call for national elections in November 2008, some aspects of *Olam Katan's* rhetoric changed, pushing toward somewhat narrower party concerns. I will not, therefore, discuss the explicitly party-centered articles that appeared after issue 175.
9. The term *mamlakhti* (pronounced *mileil*, with the accent on the "la") refers to the wing of Religious-Zionism that is still religiously and emotionally attached to the State of Israel despite the disengagement. For an analysis of the anti-*mamlakhti* camp, which reflects an ideological commitment both similar to and different from what is being described here, see Hillel Ben Sasson, "*Iyyun BeSiah HaKoah Ha'Adkani Shel Hugei HaRav Kook Al Rek'a HaHitnatkut MiRetzu'at 'Azah UTzefon HaShomeron*," *Alpayyim*, 31 (2007), 80-89.
10. Weil, "*HaHavayah*," p. 51. Also see Etinger, "*Mi Amar*."
11. Interview with Russo. Weil, "*HaHavayah*," reports that *Sihat HaShavua* of Habad is printed in 180,000 copies and *Ma'ayan HaShavua* of Shas is printed in 120,000 copies. They are exceptional in that regard.
12. On the popularity of *Olam Katan*, see Weil, "*HaHavayah*," pp. 48-51.
13. One of the most popular columns, pioneered in *Olam Katan* and later copied in other pamphlets, is the "*Shut SMS*," which allows readers to ask *halakhic* questions and receive responses by cell phone text message. A selection of these exchanges—with range from the most basic and banal *halakhic* questions to ones of a highly individualistic and personal nature—are printed each week in only tens of characters.
14. In both *Olam Katan* and other *parshat hashavua* pamphlets, the line between Torah and political or social editorializing is difficult to define, and methodological purists might suggest that I am imposing those categories on literature that rejects such a distinction. Still, while *Shabbat BeShabbato*, for example, more or less confines its political and social commentary to the back page, *Olam Katan* has a higher ratio of social and political commentary to "pure Torah."
15. Regarding advertisements, one editor is quoted as saying, "I am not comfortable with the advertisements, but there is no other way to maintain this." At the end of the day, the salaries of the editors, advertising agencies, and distributors are paid

by the advertisers, and profit is a significant motivating factor in the growth of this media. In fact, some of the *parshat hashavua* pamphlets, such as *Shabbaton* or *Mishav*, are sponsored not by ideological organizations, but by for-profit companies who use the *divrei Torah* in order to legitimate circulating their advertising in the synagogue. On advertisements, see Ettinger, “*Mi Amar*,” and Caplan, “*Alonei*,” p. 457. On layout, see Yoav Shorek’s “*Harbeh Min HaOr*,” *Akdamos* 9 (2000), 223-224, and Caplan, “*Alonei*,” pp. 469-471 .

16. In synagogues in which I have visited, it is not uncommon to see both youth and adults sitting casually with its large 61x47 cm. pages unfolded in front of them, reading it during services like subway passengers with their copies of *The New York Times*. Russo indicated that he hopes that the large format makes it more uncomfortable to read during services, though he suspects that this is not a particularly effective method of avoiding improper behavior.
17. The target audience, according to the editors, are youth between ages eighteen and twenty-five, though there is good reason to suspect that many readers are younger or older. The editors themselves are in their late twenties and early thirties (interview with Russo). While there are pamphlets specifically for children and some with a “children’s page” (see Caplan, “*Alonei*,” pp. 476-477), to the best of my knowledge *Olam Katan* is unique in its focus on young adults. Further, it is the only one with which I am familiar that gives significant voice to young writers.
18. The editors are independent of any institution or formal rabbinic oversight, though Russo indicated that they generally turn to several leading rabbis and educators for advice. Pamphlets such as *Kolekh* and *Shabbat Shalom*, associated with the left of Modern Orthodoxy, also raise voices from outside of Orthodoxy.
19. According to the editor, *Olam Katan* receives many responses but prints only ones that address an issue from a new angle. The responses are edited for content and politeness. For responses and internal debate, see, for example, the discussion of boycotting stores that hire Arab labor (*Olam Katan*, 164, p. 8); the interview with R. Aharon Lichtenstein, (*Olam Katan*, 171, pp. 5-6), which explicitly bills him as an alternative to other rabbinic voices; and the attack on rabbinic attitudes toward homosexuality (*Olam Katan*, 154, p. 8, in response to *Olam Katan*, 153, p. 3).
20. Religious-Zionism is even more diverse than the impression given here because the range of voices in *Olam Katan* do not include the entire spectrum and privileges certain voices over others. For the most part, I will not cite authors by name. Their individuality as authors is less important here than the attempt to portray the collective ideological voice which *Olam Katan* airs, advocates, and exemplifies.
21. It is not always clear whether the advertisers share *Olam Katan*’s vision or whether they express themselves in this language in order to appeal to *Olam Katan*’s readership.

22. Russo explained that he sees the title as referring both to the modest smallness of the individual, and to the fact that that small individual is capable of changing the world. This idea is related, but hardly identical, to the meaning that I am associating, perhaps somewhat homiletically, with the title.
23. Yoel Finkelman, "On the Irrelevance of Religious-Zionism," *Tradition* 39:1 (2005), 21-44.
24. On Netziv's frustration with the secular nature of the early Zionist settlers, see Gil S. Perl, "No Two Minds Are Alike: Tolerance and Pluralism in the Work of Netziv," *The Torah U-Madda Journal*, 12 (2004), 90-92.
25. On Rav Reines, see Michael Tzvi Nehorai, "*LeMahutah Shel HaTzionut HaDatit: Iyyun BeMishnoteihem Shel HaRav Reines VeHaRav Kook*," *BeShevilei HaTehiyah* 3 (1989), 25-38, as well as Aviezer Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism*, trans. Jonathan Chipman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 33-36. On the challenge of religious-secular cooperation at the beginning of the Zionist movement, see Ehud Luz, *Parallels Meet: Religion and Nationalism in the Early Zionist Movement, 1882-1904*, trans. Lena J. Schramm (Philadelphia, New York, and Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1988). On Rav Soloveitchik, see his essay *Kol Dodi Dofek* trans. Lawrence Kaplan as *Fate and Destiny: From the Holocaust to the State of Israel* (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav, 2000).
26. On Rav Kook's dialectical approach to secular Jews, secular Zionism, and messianism, see Tzvi Yaron, *The Philosophy of Rabbi Kook*, trans. Avner Tomaschoff (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1991), Chap. 10; Dov Schwartz, "*Bein Zeman LaNetzah: Iyyunim BeTefisat HaAra'ut Shel HaHillun BaRa'ayon HaTzioni HaDati*," in *Yahadut Penim VaHutz: Dialog Bein Olamot*, ed. Avi Sagi, Dudi Schwartz, and Yedidya Stern (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 169-181; idem, *Etgat UMashber BeHug HaRav Kook* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2001), 45ff. Also see Jerome I. Gellman, "Zion and Jerusalem: The Jewish State in the Thought of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook," in *Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and Jewish Spirituality*, ed. Lawrence J. Kaplan and David Shatz (New York and London: New York University Press, 1995), 276-289.
27. On land, messianism, and the Jewish People in settler ideology, see Gideon Aran, "Jewish Zionist Fundamentalism: The Bloc of the Faithful in Israel (Gush Emunim)," in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991), 265-344; idem. "A Mystical-Messianic Interpretation of Modern Israeli History: The Six Day War as a Key Event in the Development of the Original Religious Culture of Gush Emunim," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 4 (1988), 263-275; David Newman, "From *Hitnachalut* to *Hitnatkut*: The Impact of Gush Emunim and the Settler Movement on Israeli Politics and Society," *Israel Studies*, 10:3 (2005): 192-224.
28. For a fuller treatment of Religious-Zionist responses to the disengagement, see Lilly Weissbrod, "Coping with the Failure of a Prophecy: The Israeli Disengagement from the Gaza Strip," *Journal of Religion and Society* 10 (2008), available at <http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/pdf/2008-2.pdf>, viewed Dec. 22, 2008.

29. On the destructive nature of postmodernism, see *Olam Katan*, 164, p. 5.
30. Weil, "HaHavayah," 51. Also see *Olam Katan*, 152, p. 6, and Ettinger, "Mi Amar."
31. On the desire to blame the problems on the elite rather than the masses, see Jonathan Cohen, "Group Identity," p. 263.
32. See Weissbrod, "Prophecy."
33. In this, contemporary Religious-Zionism has much in common with America's self-proclaimed Moral Majority of the 1980s. Facing a perceived crisis of modern individualism and a weakness in the original and supposedly authentic Protestant American values, the Moral Majority called on American evangelicals to emerge from their isolationism to have an impact on America, to change America from the inside, and to do so by taking over the cultural and political institutions which were, it was claimed, fueling America's secular self-destruction. For more on this theme, see Susan Friend Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). This is related to a phenomenon that scholars have referred to as a "world transformer" style of fundamentalism, one that attempts to emerge from its enclave to influence and change the world around it. See Gabriel Almond, Scott Appleby and Emmanuel Sivan, *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalism Around the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 168-179 (though the book does not associate Gush Emunim with this model).
34. There is one Religious-Zionist *parshat hashavua* pamphlet that is, at least overtly, designed for the secular public, namely *Rosh Yehudi*. However, many of its articles are full of internal Religious-Zionist language and categories and seem to be for internal consumption. Also see Caplan, "Alonei," 471-480.
35. In a previous essay I questioned whether this was a long-term trend or a short-lived rhetorical episode. With the perspective of several years, it seems to be taking hold rather strongly. See my, "On the Irrelevance of Religious-Zionism," 30-31. The theme of *hahzarah beteshuvah* gets more emphasis in *Ma'aynei HaYeshuva*, *Rosh Yehudi* and *BeAhavah UveEmunah* than it does in *Olam Katan*.
36. Also see the advertisement on *Olam Katan*, 161, p. 1, and the interview in 154, p. 5. Also see *Olam Katan*, 174, p. 4 and 169, p. 3.
37. *Iggrot HaRa'ayah* (Jerusalem: Mosad HaRav Kook, 1962), vol. 2, 340. For a brief English summary of the larger issue, see Yaron, *The Philosophy of Rav Kook*, Chap. 8.
38. The advertisement does not seem aware of the irony in suggesting that students who feel that they must study economics in a special track for religious people might not develop the skills to integrate into larger society. Also see the wider discussion of proper economic policy in *Olam Katan*, 180. The lead article in this issue quotes a major rabbinic figure at the time of the Great Depression who seemed to believe that money can never actually be lost, since if one person spends it another one gains it. If this is the level of economic sophistication with which the future Religious-Zionist leadership comes to problems of the current global economic crisis, then the possibility of a genuinely Jewish economy strikes

me as extremely remote. (Interestingly, the American Haredi monthly, *The Jewish Observer*, recently quoted the same rabbi, echoing the same misunderstanding of economics. See “The Current Crisis and Its Causes,” *The Jewish Observer*, 41:8 [November, 2008], 8-9).

39. Quoted in Ben Sasson, “*Siah HaKoah*,” 79
40. This theme of a Religious-Zionist Prime Minister and political leadership appeared well before the announcement of the elections that were held in early 2009. In fact, once the elections became a reality, this rhetoric slowed. *Olam Katan* celebrated the creation of the briefly unified Religious-Zionist *HaBayit HaYehudi* party and lamented its quick fragmentation. However, under conditions of actual elections, it became clear that there would be no Religious-Zionist Prime Minister, at least not this time around. Hence, speaking of one would create an impression of lack of seriousness rather than of political optimism.
41. *Sippur Katan: Sefer HaSippurim Shel HaShevu'on Olam Katan* (Jerusalem: Olam Katan, 2006-2008). Also see *Olam Katan*, 182, pp. 4-5 on fiction. According to at least one secular critic, the book is so poor, the stories so shallow and unimaginative, that it is clear that Religious-Zionism does not have a rich understanding of the human experience. See Ron Ben-Nun, “*Olam Katan Me'od*,” <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3634397,00.html>, viewed Dec. 7, 2008.
42. See <http://www.boombamela.co.il>, viewed Oct. 19, 2008.
43. On the centrality of modest dress for women in Religious-Zionist thought, see Yosef Ahitov, “*Tzeniut: Bein Mitos LeEtos*,” in *Ayin Tovah: Du Siah UPulmus Be-Tarbut Yisrael*, ed. Yosef Ahitov et al. (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMe'uhad, 1999), 224-263.
44. The anti-*mamlakhti* camp may be smaller, but it has a power of influence—to my mind, mostly destructive—that is out of proportion to its numbers. Also see the suggestion of not saying *Hallel* on *Yom Ha'atzma'ut*, advocated by someone who was expelled from his home during the disengagement, in *Olam Katan*, 153, p. 4. This suggestion raised the ire of an author in *Olam Katan*, 154, p. 8. Also see the response to the violence between soldiers, police, and Religious-Zionist youth in Hebron in December 2008, *Olam Katan*, 181, 3. Ehud “Barak, the idiot.... Let the Broadcasting Authority burn.... They don't want us to ‘take them over.’ So they are killing us slowly.... Someone who says not to refuse orders... should go to hell.” The editors contrasted this view with that in a facing article that demands “Heroism—yes, violence—no,” and with a letter from a secular observer who “respects and appreciates” the Religious-Zionist community but asks that they stop the violence. “If I have any more hope in this country, I expect it to come from you. I have not given up hope yet” (*Olam Katan*, 181, p. 2). Also see the pro-*mamlakhti* response in *Olam Katan*, 183, p. 3.
45. These passages are quotes from Prof. Oz Almog, who is not himself Religious-Zionist. It is clear, however, that the editors of *Olam Katan* identify strongly with much of what he said. Having him say it has the rhetorical advantage of indicating that even “objective observers,” who are not tainted by Religious-Zionist

ideology, agree with the Religious-Zionist diagnosis of the problem. In part, the sense that the reader is meant to identify with Prof. Almo—despite his criticisms of Religious-Zionism—is strengthened by the fact that the other person interviewed for that article, Dr. Gadi Taub, reflects virtual heresy in Religious-Zionist discourse by praising the withdrawal from Gaza as a return to core Zionist and democratic values, and sees much of the Religious-Zionist response and reaction to the withdrawal as anti-democratic and as subverting Zionism.

46. Also see *Olam Katan*, 171, p. 13. *Olam Katan* also laments the opposite phenomenon, secular artists who are rejected by the secular establishment when they adopt too right-wing a political stance. See *Olam Katan*, 154, p. 7, on the failure of Ariel Zilber's career once he became outspoken about his (rather extreme) right-wing political views.
47. On Rav Kook's paternalism, see Aviezer Ravitzky, "The Question of Tolerance in the Jewish Religious Tradition," in *Hazon Nahum: Studies Presented to Dr. Norman Lamm in Honor of His Seventieth Birthday*, ed. Yaakov Elman and Jeffrey Gurock (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1997), 359-391. Also see Efrat Shapira-Rosenberg's (who identifies with Religious-Zionism) column on the website of *Yediot Aharonot*, provocatively entitled "End the Occupation!" [*Dai LaKibbush*], which rejects this new "conquest-centered" attitude by Religious-Zionism and calls on the movement to go back to what she sees as the historical insistence on more humble integration. See <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3635525,00.html>, viewed Dec. 9, 2008.
48. The newspaper is not overtly religious, though it is run by religious people, is marketed to that segment of the population, and is largely read by Religious-Zionists, in large part because of its right-wing political orientation and pro-settlement attitude.
49. That *Olam Katan* is willing to criticize *Makor Rishon* so harshly is remarkable given that the newspaper serves as the distributor for the pamphlet.
50. This seems to be the attitude of at least some Religious-Zionist consumers in Gevel, "*HaTzibbur HaDati*." Also see Cohen, "*Itonut LeHatzi HaAm*," and Weil, "*HaHavayah*."
51. See Gevel, *HaTzibbur HaDati Leumi*. Also see Yonah Goodman, "*HaNo'ar HaTzioni Dati BeEin HaSe'arah*," in *Lilkot BaShoshanim—Darkei Hitmodedut VeKivvunim Hinukhi'im LeDoreinu*, ed. G. Kind (Jerusalem: NP, 2006).
52. Several Religious-Zionist Jerusalem singles reported to me that they found it fairly realistic. Or, as one of the voices in *Olam Katan* explained, "'*Serugim*' is far from perfect... just as (most of, all of) our lives are imperfect. This is a show (among other things) about my [religious single] life, and I thank... the producer who created it" (*Olam Katan*, 170, p. 4). Later in the article, the author, a *Ram* in a Religious-Zionist yeshiva, openly admits his failure to follow Jewish law related to sexuality. This admission is rare, perhaps unprecedented, in the mainstream Orthodox popular literature with which I am familiar.

53. Quoted in Ben Jacobson, "Tightly Stitched Stories," *The Jerusalem Post*, Sept. 22, 2008, available at <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1222017352074&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter>, viewed Sept. 23, 2008.
54. I have reflected on a related tension in Haredi fiction in my "Medium and Message in Contemporary Haredi Adventure Fiction," *The Torah U-Madda Journal* 13 (2005), 50-87.
55. Indeed, in the Haredi adventure novels which I studied some time ago, only a *ba'al teshuvah* could write pro-Haredi articles for the secular press. The Haredi establishment would never train its own members for such a task. See my "Medium and Message," pp. 62, 70-71.
56. See my discussion of this group in "On the Irrelevance."
57. See Asher Cohen, "*HaKippah HaSerugah UMah SheMeAhoreha: Ribbuy Zehuyot BaTzionut HaDatit*," *Akdamot* 15 (2005): 6-30.
58. See <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3614729,00.html>, viewed Dec. 18, 2008.
59. Also see Jeffrey Saks' contribution to this volume, which discusses initiatives to provide religious information, services, and culture to the non-Orthodox public.