When Marc Shapiro’s article on Rambam’s thirteen principles first appeared in the 1993 volume of The Torah u-Madda Journal,¹ it deservedly received a good deal of attention but not much explicit scholarly review. Many people read the article but almost no one published evaluation of its content. Now that Shapiro has expanded his article into a book entitled The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised,² the time has come for such an evaluation. The book echoes the essential argument of the article and adds many more footnotes to the impressive collection that already existed in the earlier work. Indeed, all the strengths and weaknesses of the original remain intact in this new volume.

The strengths are dual. Shapiro’s range of reading is nothing short of astounding. Late Ashkenasic halakhic responsa, supercommentaries on Rashi and Ibn Ezra, little known hasidic texts, medieval philosophic works read by few, kabbalistic texts from Aleppo, writings of forgotten

---

YITZCHAK BLAU teaches at Yeshivat Hamivtar in Efrat, Israel. He has published articles on Jewish ethics, Zionism, Jewish education, twentieth century rabbinic figures, and other aspects of Jewish thought.
twentieth century rabbis, the entire gamut of modern academic Jewish scholarship and many other famous and obscure texts find their way into this volume. Numerous readers were impressed by this aspect of the original article and the range has increased significantly in the book.

Additionally, Shapiro succeeds at proving his essential thesis. While it is popularly assumed that Rambam’s thirteen principles always enjoyed universal acceptance, Shapiro shows that this was not true during either the period of the rishonim or of the aḥaronim. Many traditional authorities contested aspects of the principles as formulated by Rambam. For example, recognized authorities allowed prayer addressed to angels, admitted the possibility of another prophet equaling Moshe’s prophetic ability, suggested that God could change the Torah if He saw fit to do so, claimed that God created the world out of pre-existing matter and did not feel the need to view the Torah in our hands today as identical to the letter with the Torah received at Sinai. Rambam’s principles categorize all these positions as heretical, but Rambam’s stature and the firmness of his stance did not silence opposition. In this regard, Shapiro has done a service in correcting a popular misconception.

On the book’s last page, Shapiro writes of the book’s significance in the context of reigning trends in Orthodoxy. “Together with the turn to the right in Orthodoxy, which has led to an increasing stringency in many areas of halakhah, an ever increasing dogmatism in matters of belief is also apparent” (p. 158). Shapiro apparently sees this volume as an important resource against this dogmatism, and indeed it is. If R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik can be accused of heresy for writing that secular Zionists acquired the land of Israel through building an altar of factories (a homiletic expression of their dedication) and if Rav Kook can be termed a well known heretic, then the misuse of the term “heresy” has gotten out of hand. More recent misuse of the term “heresy” includes attacks on the revadim approach to gemara learning and the banning of books that portray the human dimension of biblical heroes. Yahadut can accommodate a good deal of diverse opinion and even sharp debate without anyone being branded a kofer.

However, Shapiro makes no reference to a danger found on the opposing point of the Orthodox spectrum. Under the influence of modern relativism and epistemological skeptics, many contemporary writers attempt to deny the significance of dogmas in Judaism altogether. Tamar Ross argues that Rav Kook views Jewish beliefs as having only instrumental value but not as cognitive truths. She argues for a position in which we view Buddhism, Christianity and Islam as equal manifesta-
tions of the same truth as Judaism. Menachem Kellner published a book arguing that beliefs are not a basis for deciding who is part of the religious community. In a more quixotic venture, Aryeh Botwinick tries to identify Rambam's negative theology with post-modern skepticism. Gili Zivan explores the post-modern implications of contemporary Jewish theologians who despair of the notion of objective truth. David Singer compares David Berger to Torquemada for arguing that the idea of a messiah having a second coming in order to fulfill the messianic prophecies is beyond the pale. While it is difficult to estimate the influence of these writers, I think it fair to say that the liberal edge of Orthodoxy is tempted by this position. Self-referential usage of the term "halakhic" in place of "Orthodox" may reflect this ideology. No doubt, adherents of the Orthoprax approach will be quick to utilize Shapiro's work as a support. Had Shapiro also kept this second extreme in mind and taken steps to more forcefully combat it, he would have written a better book.

Although the topic deserves a separate essay, I will briefly explain why the Orthoprax position is unacceptable. If Judaism demands halakhic practice without an ideology of belief to justify that practice, then such mizvah performance becomes reduced to mindless behaviorism. If we admit the need for a background structure of beliefs but hold that those beliefs radically change over time, then it becomes meaningless to talk of the ongoing tradition of Judaism. Imagine a "save the whales" organization consistently maintaining the same policies even as its ideology shifts from a concern for animals to a belief in whales as deities. Despite the group's unchanging practice, they could hardly be considered the same group as before. Likewise, a Judaism that maintains halakhic observance but drops traditional conceptions of God would actually be an entirely new entity. When kashrut changes from the command of an omniscient, benevolent God to a folk practice of the Jewish people, à la Mordechai Kaplan, the shift in ideologies justifying observance is too dramatic to talk about the continuity of Yahadut. A critic of the above argument might counter by talking about continuity in terms of the Jewish family. Menachem Brinker explicitly takes this approach. “The bonds among the generations are based on the feeling of their being part of one family. As happens in a family, beliefs and ideas change from generation to generation (including religious, philosophical and ethical views) but identity and continuity remain. . . .” However, the very example chosen by Brinker shows the shortcomings of this entire approach. Brinker's example works only because family identity need
not depend on a particular vision of the good but a religious or ethical ideal does depend on just such a vision. In other words, Brinker’s approach allows us to speak of the continuity of the Jewish people but not of the continuity of Judaism.

Furthermore, the equation of the truth of Judaism with that of other religions fails to address certain yes or no questions. Either there is a personal God who has a relationship with humans or there is not (Buddhism). Either mitzvot remain the royal road to spiritual accomplishment or they do not (Christianity). Either God takes human form (Christianity) or He does not. Due to the unbridgeable gaps between religions, the attempt to equate disparate religions often entails the evisceration of one. As G. K. Chesterton wrote, “Buddhism and Christianity are very much alike, especially Buddhism.”15 Nor should we give credence to the claim that asserting the exclusive truth of one’s own religion reflects arrogance. Quite the contrary! The devout believer who argues seriously with a representative from a different faith shows more respect for his opponent than the relativist who claims that all religions are the same.

Some writers contend that the absence of an explicit worked out list of dogmas in Tanakh or Ḥazal reveals that dogma represents a late intrusion into Jewish thought. Yet the fact that a written list of dogmas did not exist before the medieval period does not indicate that no dogma existed beforehand. Even if we assume that historical challenges from other faiths or sectarians inspired the listing of dogmas, this would not show that beliefs did not matter beforehand. David Berger cogently argues that “they did not articulate these principles until they were challenged, but once challenged, they fleshed out a position that they had always taken for granted.”16 Crucial beliefs can be implicit in a work and almost every book in Tanakh makes certain common foundational assumptions about Hashem, the giving of mitzvot and reward and punishment. R. Yisrael Lipshutz shows some insight when, in commenting on a tannaitic statement praising a person who combines mishnah, mikra and derekh erez, he identifies mishnah as the source of Jewish law but mikra as the source of Jewish beliefs.17 If so, we can argue that traditional Jewish beliefs go back to the founding of the Jewish people.

I hasten to add that Shapiro explicitly rejects the Orthoprax position. He dedicates a few pages of the introduction to attacking the notion that Judaism can exist without dogmas. He cites approvingly the statement of Salis Daiches that “all authoritative exponents of Judaism are agreed as to the necessity of making spiritual truth the basis for
material action (p. 32).” Yet he does not attempt to give a broad outline of what the dogmas of Judaism might be. If we reject the Rambam’s formulation, we still need to provide a different formulation and to explain what beliefs fail to cohere with Yahadut. Shapiro thus successfully prevents the Rambam’s list from assuming authority in every detail but does not help us find a substitute list. To be fair, Shapiro writes as an intellectual historian and not as a theologian. Nonetheless, some first steps towards a positive construction of dogma are called for.

The first point that might be made in opposing the latitudinarian approach to dogma is that rejecting the Rambam’s list can lead both to a diminishing of dogma or to an increase of dogmas. Shapiro cites various interpretations that when Rambam formulated his thirteen principles, he was not attempting to outline the definitive list of Jewish beliefs but was merely attempting to convey Jewish beliefs in a general way to the masses (Abravanel), trying to arrive at the number thirteen in order to correspond to the Divine attributes or limiting himself to beliefs explicitly taught in biblical verses (Shimon ben Zemah Duran). If so, other beliefs not found on the list of thirteen may belong in the exhaustive compilation of Jewish dogma. For example, many wonder why the Rambam does not count free will as a dogma even though he repeatedly emphasizes the significance of this belief. R. Gedalyah Lipshutz answered that free will is implicit in the principles affirming reward and punishment. R. Yosef Albo answered that Rambam only lists principles specifically necessary for religion, and free will is a crucial postulate of any legal system. The common denominator of the above answers is that free will does represent a non-negotiable Jewish belief even if it does not explicitly appear on the list of thirteen principles. Thus, the downplaying of Rambam’s list can actually lead to a longer list of fundamental beliefs.

Secondly, in many of Shapiro’s examples, one can reject Rambam’s specific formulation and reformulate the principle in a fashion that will unify the conflicting viewpoints. Some rishonim may believe in beriah yesh mi-yesh, but we can still state an overarching dogma that God preceded our world and created it at a given point in time. Even those authorities who think it possible that God could change the Torah prior to the world to come limit that possibility to an event that mirrors the wondrous miracle of Sinai with more than half a million witnesses. Thus, we can formulate a dogma that will make it almost impossible for Torah to change. The rabbanim who allow prayer to angels admit that angels are not beings with the power to challenge God or function inde-
pendently of His will. We can state a dogma not to pray to angels as independent governors of human affairs.

The eighth principle regarding the Torah revealed to Moshe serves as good example of the unifying approach. No doubt, the issues of keri u-ketiv, some understandings of Tikkun Soferim, one view on the Torah’s dotted letters and the variant biblical manuscripts make it untenable to assert that our Torah matches letter for letter with that given at Sinai. Yet this should not render it impossible to formulate a dogma that the Torah in its essence, with minor changes here or there, was dictated by God to Moshe. Even if we accept the apparent view of Ibn Ezra, that some verses were added later, the dogma can still be formulated. Note that R. Yosef Bonfils, the famed commentator on Ibn Ezra who explains his subject’s radical views, suggests various limitations on Ibn Ezra’s position. Perhaps later prophets added only narrative material but did not touch legal sections and perhaps they only added phrases or sentences but not entire sections. Indeed, Ibn Ezra forcefully attacks a Karaite writer for claiming that an entire parashah was a later addition. Beyond the limitations mentioned by R. Yosef, I would also add that all of the verses mentioned by Ibn Ezra are relatively peripheral to the biblical story, such as an aside alluding to where Og’s crib can be found. By incorporating such limitations on post-Mosaic verses, it would seem possible to allow for a few isolated verses as coming from a later prophet while still asserting that for all intents and purposes, the Torah of ours can be traced back to Moshe.

It may be that we should reject Ibn Ezra’s view as a maverick position outside the consensus. Even if we do accept it as a legitimate possibility, the fact that we cannot give a concrete number of verses that can be attributed to a later author without sliding into heresy in no way invalidates the idea that a boundary exists. All concepts include gray areas but those questionable areas do not undermine the concepts. The fact that we are unsure whether or not abortion and euthanasia are murder does not mitigate the horror of murder. As Dr. Johnson remarked, the fact that there is a twilight does not minimize the distinction between day and night. We can exclude Ibn Ezra’s view from the charge of heresy, remain unsure about how much more latitude to give for an expansion of Ibn Ezra, and still confidently assert that J, P, E and D are beyond the pale.

Thus far, we have shown how dogma can be maintained even if we accept all the theological positions located by Shapiro as authoritative. Yet we can also challenge his methodological assumption that all positions that once appeared in a rabbinic work of stature achieve legiti-
cy by definition. In support of such an assumption, Shapiro cites two authors who reject the idea of pesak by consensus in the world of theology. Chaim Rapoport asks: “Could it be that whether or not souls are reincarnated depends upon the majority opinion” (p. 145)? One can hardly disagree with Rapoport’s statement that metaphysical truths do not depend upon majority vote. However, his point is too strong for his own good. Metaphysical truths do not depend upon the unanimous agreement of Jewish sages through time either. If we divorce the truth question from what authorities have historically taught, why relate to the history of rabbinic thought at all? Instead, we should just bring philosophic arguments for various positions with an indifference to what anyone else ever said. Neither Rapoport nor Shapiro would take such a position and Shapiro’s wide-ranging article clearly attributes great significance to exploring the history of rabbinic thought in order to arrive at an understanding of Jewish theology. If that is so, talking about a consensus can make sense.

Shapiro also cites David Weiss Halivni.

Issues of doctrine, in contrast [to halakhah] cannot be settled merely through the consensus suggested by a vote of the majority nor by the judgment rendered by the passage of history... Additionally, a theological doctrine that was once considered legitimate cannot be branded heretical through the mere passage of time, for historical, and thus contingent, factors have no role to play in the resolution of purely intellectual matters. If an authoritative figure in the Jewish past maintained a certain speculative standpoint, the truth or falsity of such cannot be determined by tradition or consensus, and thus its legitimacy cannot be judged by the systemic principles which govern the halakhic process (pp. 145-146).

This citation includes three different claims. 1) Hashkafic debates are not decided in the same way as halakhic debates. 2) Once a belief was considered legitimate, it cannot be overruled by later Jewish history. 3) Any belief once maintained by an authoritative figure cannot be rejected. These three points are logically distinct. I can agree with the first claim without coming to the conclusion that no decisions can ever be reached in theological debates among traditional figures. The methodology may differ from halakhic decision making but that does not mean that no decisionmaking method exists altogether. Perhaps majority vote plays no role in the world of hashkafah, but a near unanimous vote does. Nor are the second and third claims identical. A position may have been taken by a given authoritative figure without that position being “considered legitimate.” Let us say, for the sake of argument, that R. Ḥasdai Crescas was indeed a determinist. Does this mean
that this belief was once considered legitimate? Not at all. Other rabbis may not have explicitly protested this position because few of them learned *Or Hashem*, because they learned *Or Hashem* but understood it in a non-deterministic way, or because they thought the offending passages had little influence and did not need to be combatted. If so, the lack of strident protest against this aspect of R. Crescas’s thought says little about the rabbinic world granting it legitimacy.

Weiss Halivni may counter by asserting the third claim, that any view once expressed by a rabbinic great is ipso facto legitimate irrespective of whether or not anyone else accepted it. I see little reason to assume such a conclusion. Let us say for the sake of argument (although I think it true as well) that Torah and *Tanakh* clearly assume free will and that denying free will makes a mockery of the concepts of *mizvot* and *sekhar ve-onesh*. Can we not consider determinism incompatible with Judaism just because one *rishon* was a determinist? It seems reasonable to me to suggest the following three criteria for the illegitimacy of a doctrine. We should consider a doctrine illegitimate only when all three criteria are met. 1) Almost no rabbis of stature in Jewish history taught this doctrine. 2) The doctrine conflicts with other Torah ideals or the simple thrust of *Tanakh* and *Hazal*. 3) The conflict with Torah/ *Hazal* revolves around a matter of momentous import. Denying that the prophet Ovadyah existed might meet the first two criteria but be judged not monumental enough to meet the third criteria. Denying the Egyptian exodus, on the other hand, could meet all three. Although we should not be quick to employ this veto, we should reject some maverick and problematic positions taken by recognized authorities. Two examples that come to mind are R. Crescas’ determinism and Rambam’s linking reward and punishment solely to intellectual achievement (assuming that this correctly portrays Rambam’s position in, e.g., *Guide* 3:17-18). Both can boast of an extremely small number of adherents, both fly in the face of the spirit of *Tanakh* and *Hazal* and both address a matter of immense significance. Why can’t we reject those positions as incompatible with Judaism even if a truly great rabbinic voice uttered them?

Lest it be thought that allowing these criteria to form a consensus invariably leads to a monolithic Judaism, I would point attention to some current communal debates. Today’s Orthodox world divides on issues such as secular studies, Zionism and women’s issues. In each of these examples, the first criterion alone would make it impossible to brand the major views as heretical. The history of rabbinic thought includes a wide diversity of approaches to gentile wisdom, the balance
between human initiative and Divine providence (manifest in varying approaches to the state of Israel) and the quickness with which we can rely on minority positions in order to help those who feel excluded or to arrive at a position compatible with our best efforts at moral wisdom (manifest in the issues about women). Therefore, we can debate the various positions in these controversies and even argue for a given position as the correct approach without seeing a different view as heretical. In the same fashion, different approaches to methodologies of learning and to the balance between learning and other *mizvot* all fall within acceptable boundaries. We can allow for significant differences on many issues even as we assert a consensus that rejects isolated minority positions.

Furthermore, the impressive list of sources compiled by Shapiro includes figures whose authoritative status is unclear. Here, his erudition may get in the way of the argument. Among others, Shapiro cites R. Shem Tov Gaguine, R. Shneur Zalman Dov Anushiski, R. Isaac Lopes and R. Isaac Pilitz. These writers may have been great sages but this reader failed to recognize any of the names and wondered whether or not much weight should be given to their positions. In the case of R. Anushiski, Shapiro cites a long list of *haskamot* that appeared before one of Anushiski’s works (p. 112, n. 157). Yet we would certainly not bestow canonical status on many contemporary volumes that boast significant approbations. Shapiro needs to do more work to convince us of the significance of the more peripheral voices.

Finally, Shapiro makes a mistake or two and includes some questionable readings. Although he certainly proves that we cannot blithely identify our Torah as identical to the letter with the Torah at Sinai, he mars this correct argument by including an erroneous proof. A midrash teaches us that R. Meir’s Torah text read “*vi-hinei tov mavet*” in place of “*ve-hinei tov me’od*.” Shapiro adds that “According to Nahmanides, this was not the result of an error made by an ignorant scribe, but rather R. Meir himself was responsible for the variant (p. 96).” A brief glance at the passage in Ramban reveals that while Ramban does think that R. Meir wrote these words, Ramban explicitly says that R. Meir mistakenly wrote “*tov mavet*” as he was thinking that death also is part of the good of creation and that thought erroneously made its way onto the page. This mistake fails to contribute to the argument, conducted successfully by Shapiro, that we cannot claim certain knowledge of the authoritative biblical text to the letter.

Among the more debatable citations in this volume, I would mention that Shapiro assumes a radically intellectualist reading of the
Rambam (pp. 134-138) that ignores both Rambam’s concluding section of the *Guide*, which states that the intellectual achievement must find expression in ethical action as we imitate the Divine, as well as the important study of Ehud Benor on Rambam’s vision of the good life.\(^26\) Shapiro cites the author of *Tiferet Yisra’el* as possibly believing in an anthropomorphic God (pp. 65-66) when *Tiferet Yisra’el* is quite explicit elsewhere that God lacks physicality.\(^27\) Shapiro cites scholars who understand Hillel’s explaining his trip to the bathhouse with the fact that humans were created *be-zemel Elokim* as suggestive of a corporeal God (p. 49). This need not follow. Even if *zelem* refers to humanity’s capacity for rational thought or free choice and not to a physical quality, the physical body can still serve as a symbol for the being with those incorporeal divine abilities. Respecting the body of a being created in the Image of God need not reveal a bodily conception of that very image. Finally, Shapiro cites Yisrael Knohl’s argument for post-Mosaic authorship of Torah verses because Ezra refers to the intermarriage prohibition as a commandment from “thy servants the prophets” (*Ezra* 9:12-13) even though that prohibition appears in *Humash* (pp. 103-104).\(^28\) In response to this argument, let us consider a fellow who comes home from shul and reports that the rabbi directed the congregants to be more zealous in Sabbath observance. That fellow means that the rabbi encouraged a fulfillment of a directive already given and not that the rabbi is the historical originator of that directive. In the same way, many prophets charged the people with the need to refrain from intermarriage but the original prohibition came via Moshe.

Even when we take these weaknesses into account, Shapiro has brought enough material from recognized authorities to prove his thesis denying that Rambam’s principles represent the final word in Jewish theology. At the same time, as Shapiro himself acknowledges, and as we have argued above, dogma remains an integral aspect of Judaism. Lest this thought frighten readers into nightmares about a potential Jewish run inquisition, let me remind the readers that many authorities, including Ravad, R. Yosef Albo and others, absolve the person who comes to a heretical belief through an honest attempt to understand Torah from the status of “heretic.”\(^29\) Furthermore, many authorities see the atheistic *zeitgeist* as mitigating the guilt for shortcomings in religious practice and belief.\(^30\) In today’s epistemologically skeptical climate, it is not easy to affirm cognitive truth claims. Therefore, we can keep the category of heresy relevant without branding every offender as a heretic.

Beyond the mitigating factors listed above, David Berger has proposed a helpful distinction between beliefs that are illegitimate and
beliefs that are heretical. We can refer to problematic beliefs as beyond the “limits of historical consensus” without branding it heresy. “Such a standard enables us to exclude a particular position from the community without declaring that its adherents are prime candidates for perdition.” In adherence with this approach, we will not consider it our job to discuss which controversial figures have a share in the world to come but only to analyze which beliefs fall out of the bounds of our tradition.

Additionally, identifying the cognitive truths that Judaism teaches does not lead to the conclusion that those lacking such truths lead spiritually worthless lives. Adherents of other faiths can be right about many aspects of the truth even as they make some significant errors. The same Rambam who formulated dogmas viewed the spreading of Christianity and Islam as steps helping humanity move from the gross errors of paganism to the refined truths of Judaism. Moreover, we can still view the worthwhile deeds performed by such people as spiritually valuable and deserving of reward. Despite his concrete belief in theism, R. Kook attributed value to the ethical performance of atheists. We can maintain a belief in dogmas without coming to problematic conclusions about the non-believers.

Before concluding, I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting that hashkafic debates be decided with the same consistency, regularity and methodology as halakhic arguments. As Shapiro cites, several traditional sources do indicate a greater ability to refrain from final decisions in matters of hashkafah. A number of factors might explain this greater fluidity and freedom. In the case of hashkafic debates, we lack the motivation of wanting to arrive at some unified communal practice. Secondly, the personal quality of hashkafic issues might call for more leeway as each person searches for his or her connection with Torah. Also, we might be reluctant to ask a person to challenge his or her best understanding of metaphysical truths. Even taking these factors into consideration, they do not lead to the dissolution of dogma. We can allow flexibility up to the point when certain fundamentals are abandoned. Judaism resembles a structure with much leeway on most floors but an inflexible foundation at the ground level. Shapiro deserves credit for showing that that Rambam did not precisely identify the foundation. Nevertheless, the foundation continues to exist.
Notes


4. Regarding Rav Kook, see the comments of R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapiro of Munkacz, *Divrei Torah*, vol. 6, no. 82 (Jerusalem 1998), cited by Shapiro on p. 27, note 146. The following section of *Divrei Torah* has a fascinating attack on the institution of *daf yomi*.

5. The *revadim* approach attempts to teach students how to learn gemara by separating the different historical strands in the talmudic discussion. The practitioners of this method explain their approach at www.talmud-revadim.co.il. A harsh response appears in Assaf Golan, “Bikoret ha-Talmud Lo Ta’azzil et Shiurei Gemara,” *Ha-z. ofeh* (January 31, 2003), p. 12. The author refers to the *revadim* approach as “a dangerous form of heresy.” Of course, there may be good reason to oppose this approach but that does not make it heretical.

6. This issue has recently come to the fore with the banning of Rav Yuval Sherlo’s books in some *hesder yeshivot*, although I am not sure if the term heresy was employed in that context. A prior manifestation where the term “apikoros” was used was the attack on Rav Adin Steinsalz’s *Biblical Images*. See R. Elazar Menahem Shakh, *Mikhtavim u-Ma’amarim*, vol. 4, pp. 65-67. Cf. Rav Aharon Kotler, *Mishnat Rabbi Aharon*, vol. 3 (Lakewood, 1988), 181-182, where the author employs the term “heresy” to describe both those who read the dispute between Sarah and Hagar as being a human dispute about mothers trying to help their children and those who understand Yaakov’s love for Rahel in human, mundane terms.


12. David Singer, “The Rebbe, the Messiah and the Heresy Hunter,” *First Things* (June/July 2003): 42-49. It is a shame that after David Berger wrote a letter in which he made several significant points in response to Singer (see the October 2003 issue of *First Things*), Singer chose to repeat his accusations without addressing any of Berger’s points.
13. Arguably, manifestations of this position appear in the right wing world as well. Criticism of Ḥabad for not sleeping in the sukkah may have had more impact in the ḥaredi world than criticisms relating to emunot ve-de’ot. This exclusive focus on halakhic observance also reflects a general lack of interest in and ignorance of theology.


17. R. Yisrael Lipshutz, Tiferet Yisra’el on Kiddushin 1:10, Yakhin note 79.

18. Rosh Amanah, chapter 23.

Both possibilities appear in Ohev Mishpat, chapter 8. Duran rejects the idea that Rambam was limited to the number thirteen in order to match the Divine attributes but he accepts that Rambam only listed the ikkarim taught in explicit biblical verses.

20. See the anafim section of his commentary, Ez Shatul on Sefer ha-Ikkarim 1:3.

21. Sefer ha-Ikkarim 1:9. See also the other sources cited by Shapiro on page 35, note 172.


27. R. Yisrael Lipshutz, Tiferet Yisra’el, Sanhedrin 10:1, Yakhin no. 7 and 6:4 Yakhin no. 43.


32. The contemporary Christian philosopher Eleonore Stump has suggested that we drop the category of heretic altogether but maintain the category of heresy. See her “Orthodoxy and Heresy,” in Faith and Philosophy 16:2 (April, 1999): 147-163. See also Alvin Plantinga’s response in the same volume entitled “On Heresy, Mind and Truth,” pp. 182-188.

